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Abstract:  A repurchase agreement (repo) is the sale of financial assets coupled with a promise 
to repurchase the same assets at a later date. With similar economic characteristics to secured 
loans and bank deposits, the repo market is one of the main sources of liquidity for financial 
markets and a vital segment of the US financial system. During the financial crisis of 2007-
2009, when the markets crashed and the value of many assets dropped, repo lenders lost 
confidence in the repo market and massively withdrew their financing. Panic then ensued, 
drying up the liquidity in the markets. The over-reliance on short-term repo financing 
magnified the liquidity crunch, and financial institutions such as Lehman Brothers and Bear 
Stearns were brought to the brink of ruin. The crisis unveiled the deep opacity of the repo 
market, its proneness to runs, its structural weaknesses, the interconnectedness of its 
participants, the absence of stability buffers, and the lack of any comprehensive regulatory or 
supervisory framework. Astonishingly, however, the post-crisis regulatory agenda almost 
completely ignored the repo market. Though depicted as a reform intended to create a safer 
financial system, the Dodd-Frank Act essentially left untouched this important source of 
systemic risk. 
After outlining the repo market and shedding new light on its structural instability, this 
paper presents an alternative narrative of the crisis by arguing that the structurally weak repo 
market triggered a liquidity crunch that halted the engine of the financial system. In doing so, 
the paper challenges the assumption that the crisis was caused merely by over-the-counter 
derivatives, securitization, and too-big-to-fail institutions. 
This paper shows how the repo market has developed within the financial markets – free 
from the watchful eyes of regulators and capitalizing on regulatory arbitrage – and challenges 
the regulatory void of the Dodd-Frank Act vis-à-vis the repo market. Specifically, this paper 
presents an original two-step policy option for assessing the repo market, based on the lesson 
of the post-crisis reforms of over-the-counter derivatives market as well as the incremental role 
envisioned by lawmakers for “financial market infrastructure” and central clearing 
counterparties as stability mechanisms. This paper calls for the assessment of the necessity of a 
structural intervention in the repo market to fix the failures that currently characterize it, and 
suggests that more transparency, coupled with a strong financial market infrastructure, would 
make the repo market more transparent, stable, and resilient. 
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 2 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Liquidity is the oxygen of financial markets and can be raised in different ways.1 
The 2007-2009 financial crisis (the Crisis) revealed how heavily financial 
institutions relied on the securities funding market and on short-term financing 
contracts – namely repurchase agreements (repo) – to raise (short-term) liquidity 
over the last fifteen years. However, when this source of liquidity dried up and 
financial institutions ran out of liquidity, the markets panicked and the Crisis 
ensued.2 Countrywide Securities, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Reserve 
Primary Fund are all examples of firms that collapsed dramatically when they ran 
out of liquidity. Indeed, these four financial institutions were caught in a liquidity 
crunch, and were all at the core of the Crisis and the subsequent larger economic 
crisis.3  
The market for repo – the sale of financial assets coupled with a promise to 
repurchase the same assets at a later date – was at the epicenter of the Crisis. 
Repos have similar economic characteristics to secured loans and bank deposits. 
They also have similar structural weaknesses: over-reliance on the stability of 
collateral value (as with secured loans) and proneness to “runs” (as with bank 
deposits). When the market crashed and the value of many assets dropped, repo 
lenders lost confidence in the repo market and massively withdrew their financing. 
Panic then ensued, drying up the liquidity in the market. Despite the repo market’s 
significant role in the Crisis, however, there has been a general regulatory void vis-
à-vis the repo market.4 Neither domestic nor international policymakers 
prioritized reforming the repo market in the post-Crisis reform agenda, and 
                                                     
1 See William C. Dudley, President and C.E.O., N.Y. Fed. Res., Risk of Wholesale Funding, Welcoming 
remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York workshop on the “Risk of Wholesale Funding” New 
York City (Aug. 12, 2014) transcript available at http://bis.orf/review/r140818d.htm; stating ‘liquidity is 
in turn crucial to the functioning of the financial system.’  
Liquidity is a central concept for the study of financial market. Scholars identify three main dimensions of 
liquidity. (1) Market liquidity indicates ‘the ability to trade a security quickly at a price close to its consensus 
value;’ (2) funding liquidity refers to the access to sufficient cash reserves or the ‘ability to obtain credit at 
acceptable terms;’ (3) monetary liquidity describes “broader monetary aggregates;” see THIERRY FOUCAULT, 
MARCO PAGANO, AILSA RÖELL, MARKET LIQUIDITY – THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND POLICY (2014). Recently 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in its Global Financial Stability Report recommended ‘measures 
to bolster both the level of market liquidity and its reliance.’ See IMF, Market Liquidity – Resilient of 
Fleeting?, in GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT (2015); for a comment on the IMF’s contribution on 
market liquidity, Martin Wolf, Beware of the Liquidity Delusion, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2015, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c8c2cc44-68fa-11e5-a57f-21b88f7d973f.html#axzz3ntpExcUr. 
2 See Gary b. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: the Panic of 2007 (2001) [hereinafter Gorton, 
Slapped by the Invisible Hand]. 
3 See Timothy F. Geithner, Stress Test: Reflection on Financial Crisis (2014). 
4 See DAVID SKEEL, THE NEW FINANCIAL DEAL – UNDERSTANDING THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND ITS 
(UNINTENDED) CONSEQUENCES 96-97 (2011), emphasizing ‘lawmakers left an important source of rusk 
essentially untouched: investment banks’ reliance on very short-term repo financing ‘ and ‘Dodd Frank 
ignores the repo market almost completely’; Peter Eavis, Bernanke Quietly Criticizes Lack of Repo Reforms, N. 
Y. Times, Apr. 10, 2012, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/10/bernanke-quietly-admonishes-lack-
of-repo-reforms/?nl=business&emc=edit_dlbkam_20120411&_r=0. 
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commentators left the repo market at the edge of the debate on the Crisis.5 This 
paper explores why the current regulatory void exists, assesses the failures and 
vulnerabilities of the repo market, and engages in a policy discussion on how to 
strengthen this crucial element of the “plumbing” of the financial system.6  
The Crisis showed the repo market to be both a central component of the 
financial system and a source of structural vulnerabilities and externalities.7 As an 
alternative source of financing and liquidity for the traditional banking sector, the 
repo market is commonly included within the “shadow banking” system.8 Yet, 
even though regulators,9 policy makers, and academics called for “tackling” the 
“shadow banking” system,10 the repo market – despite being a main element of 
                                                     
5 See Section V; see infra notes 8, 137-141 and accompanying text. 
6 The reference to the repo market as an element of the “plumbing” of the financial system was first used 
by Darral Duffie in one of its seminal work; see Duffie, Replumbing Our Financial System, infra note 10, at 9-
10. 
7 See, e.g. Gorton, Slapped by the Invisible Hand, supra note 2; Viral V. Acharya et al., Regulating Wall 
Street - the Dodd-Frank Act and the New Architecture of global Finance (2011); Gary B. Gorton & 
Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. Fin. Econ. 2012, 425 (focusing on the 
combination of securitization and repo finance in the financial crisis). 
8 See, e.g. For a RICHARD CARNELL, JONATHAN MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF BANKING 
AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 531-536 (5th ed. 2013); Zoltan Pozsar et al., Shadow Banking (Fed. Reserve 
Bank of New York Staff Reports No. 458 July 2010, revised Feb. 2012), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr458.pdf; Stijn Claessens et at., Shadow Banking: 
Economics and Policy (IMF Staff Discussion Note 2012), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2012/sdn1212.pdf: Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Shadows: 
Financial Regulation and Reasonability Failure, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1781 (2013). Scholars have debated 
the definition of shadow banking, and have provided their perspectives on what should and should not 
be included in that concept. The results, however, are inconsistent, and despite the presence of a few 
commonly agreed-upon structural elements, the shapes and borders of the shadow banking sector are still 
not completely clear.  
9 See, e.g. Daniel K. Tarullo, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res., Shadow Banking and Systemic 
Risk Regulation, Remarks at the Americans for Financial Reform and Economic Policy Institute 
Conference, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 22, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20131122a.htm). 
10 See, e.g. Gary B. Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System (261 Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity Fall 2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects/bpea/fall%202010/2010b_bpea_gorton.pdf (analyzing 
the structure of the shadow banking system and offering a new regulatory framework for the system. As 
a first step, the authors propose, on the one hand, to narrow money market mutual funds’ activities, and 
on the other, to create narrow funding banks (NFB) that are only involved in securitization and fund 
their activities only through repo activities. As a second step, they argue for the creation of two types of 
repo: one, only offered by NFBs and commercial banks, performing a monetary function, and the other, 
offered by ad hoc licensed entities, performing other forms of short-term financing); Darrell Duffie, 
Replumbing Our Financial System: Uneven Progress, 9 INT’L J. CENT. BANKING 252 [hereinafter Duffie, 
Replumbing Our Financial System] (analysing the role of clearing banks in the tri-party repo market and 
arguing for a regulation of the tri-party market infrastructure as regulated utilities); Morgan Ricks, A 
Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability, 65 VAND. L. REV. 2013, 1290 (suggesting that the money-claim 
market should be rebuilt around a public-private partnership (PPP) system, in which issuers of money-
claims have to be licensed and subject to portfolio restrictions and capital requirements, and in which the 
government provides a safety net to any licensed entity); Carolyn Sissiko, Shadow Banking: Why Modern 
Money Markets are Less Stable than 19th c. Money Markets but Shouldn’t Be Stabilized by a 'Dealer of Last Resort', 
USC Law Legal Studies Paper No. 14-21, 2014, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2392098 (focusing on the different roles played by 
dealer banks and commercial banks ion the financial system). 
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the money market and a widely used source of capital allocation – has thus far 
barely been explored by regulators and legal commentators.11 
This paper wades into this void and targets a specific segment of “shadow 
banking”: the repo market. Specifically, this paper provides an analysis of the repo 
market by focusing on its role in the Crisis and on the regulatory and institutional 
failures in monitoring and managing the underlying risk. The paper argues that 
repo reforms might be needed to correct some of the structural market failures 
that the Crisis revealed, namely the deep opacity of the market, its structural 
weaknesses, the interconnectedness of the few market actors, the absence of 
stability buffers, the proneness of the repo market to panic and runs, and the lack 
of any comprehensive regulatory or supervisory framework. It demonstrates that 
the repo market is an important source of short-term collateralized financing for 
financial institutions and market participants. Indeed, statistics from the New 
York Federal Reserve (NY Fed), and the International Capital Market Association 
(ICMA) quantify the current size of the American and European repo markets at 
more than $10 trillion.12 
Repo has a distinctive economic and legal structure. A repo is a form of 
short-term collateralized borrowing – or alternatively, a form of short-term 
wholesale funding – structured as a sale and repurchase agreement. In a basic 
repo, a firm “borrows” cash through the sale of financial instruments (typically 
government bonds, corporate bonds, agency securities, and other forms of debt or 
equity instruments) to a “lender”. The sale contract is coupled with a repurchase 
agreement, wherein the “borrower” agrees to buy back the securities previously 
transferred to the lender at a higher price and future date.13 The transferred 
securities serve as collateral in the deal. Generally, the collateral is subject to a 
“haircut”, which expresses, via a percentage, the difference between the market 
value of the pledged collateral and the amount borrowed, and reflects the 
perceived riskiness of the assets. 
From an economic perspective, repos serve an important role in credit 
intermediation, in liquidity provision, and more broadly in the money market. 
Repos are money instruments and secured providers of short-term liquidity. They 
intervene in the market by combining and matching the financial needs of 
opposite parties, either “cash pools” (i.e., mutual funds or corporate treasuries) or 
“securities pools” (i.e., banks, broker-dealers, and securities lenders). In the repo 
                                                     
11 See, e.g. Financial Stability Board, Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking Policy 
Framework for Addressing Shadow Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos (Aug. 29, 2013), 
available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_130829b.pdf [hereinafter FSB, August 
2013 Report]; NY Fed, White Paper on Tri-Party Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Reform (May 17, 2010) 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/tpr_infr_reform.html; European Commission, Green 
paper on Shadow Banking (Mar. 19, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/shadow-banking/index_en.htm#maincontentSec3; see 
infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
12 For a detailed analysis on the repo market size see Section II.A.2. 
13 For more details see Section III. 
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market, securities dealers find the source of liquidity that they need in order to 
finance their inventory and short-term or long-term investments; to run their 
treasury activities; and, more generally, to access short-term liquidity – here is the 
parallelism of repos with secured loans. On the other side, mutual funds and 
institutions with a high cash supply look for profitable yields and secured 
opportunities in which they can deposit their extra liquidity as it earns interest – 
here is the parallelism of repos with bank deposits.14 Thus, a repo is a mechanism 
that aligns the financial needs of both of the above-mentioned parties and 
transforms them into valuable marketable transactions. 
One peculiarity of the repo market, which it shares with the traditional 
commercial depository banking system, is the role of repo in asset maturity 
transformation, which exposes it to the risk of runs. Repos perform maturity 
transformation by creating short-term claims (“short-term loans”) that can be 
“monetized” or invested in long-term financial assets. In other words, repo dealers 
borrow in the short term, but can invest in long-term project. The maturity 
mismatch between long-term assets and short-term liabilities of repo borrowers 
makes them vulnerable to the risk of run and exposes the repo market to 
procyclical behaviours. This risk is further exacerbated by the maturity of the 
contract. Repos are in fact generally short-term – often overnight – transactions 
that are frequently concluded in the late afternoon of the first day, mature by the 
middle of the second day, and are rolled over (refinanced) on the third day. This 
makes repos structurally similar to demand deposits, in which the depositor, 
namely the repo lender, can at any time withdraw its funds by deciding not to roll 
over its repo financing. 
As experienced in the midst of the Crisis, a run on the repo market is 
triggered by large withdrawals by repo lenders. Such withdrawals, which are similar 
to traditional banking deposit withdrawals, can be triggered when the repo lender 
asks for a higher haircut or decides not to roll over its financing contract. In the 
first scenario, the borrower is asked to post additional collateral to cover any 
(perceived) increased risk in the transaction or an unexpected decline in the value 
of the collateral originally posted. If the borrower fails to do that, the contract is 
terminated. Conversely, in the event the lender chooses not to roll over, the 
borrower has two options: it may buy back the securities (i.e., pay back its loan) or, 
if it lacks the liquidity to conclude the repurchase leg of the deal, it can walk away 
from the contract, leaving the collateral with the lender. 
In a normal market scenario, the lender can cover its exposure by selling the 
collateral on the market. However, as the Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns 
examples – in which both investment banks heavily relied on very short-term repo 
                                                     
14 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of Bank Regulation, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 237 (1992) (discussing capital market instruments that depository institutions can use to 
obtain funds and that are not treated as deposits subject to reserve requirements or deposit insurance 
assessment). 
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financing to support their activities –15 show, the decision of a repo lender not to 
roll over its repo financing or to ask for an increased haircut can have multiple 
serious, market-wide fallouts. First, it can directly affect the reputation of the repo 
borrower, which might result in a decreased likelihood that other parties will 
extend credit and enter into new deals with that counterparty. Second, it can 
reduce the perception of reliability of the pledge collateral, which can result in a 
market-wide depreciation of a specific class of collateral and then in fire sales of 
collateral as holders of a specific class of securities try to liquidate their securities 
on the market at a discounted price.16 Third, it can undermine the confidence in 
the repo market as a whole. Therefore, just as a commercial bank panic can result 
in massive depositors’ withdrawals, consequential risk of bank failure, and a 
potential panic spread throughout the whole banking and economic system, a loss 
of confidence in the repo market can result in a run on the short-term financing 
market, which can consequently impact the liquidity of the entire financial market. 
The Crisis provided us with a clear example of how a crisis in the repo 
market affects both repo borrowers and lenders. With regard to repo borrowers, 
Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns are the paradigmatic cases. For repo lenders, a 
classic example was Reserve Primary Fund, a money market mutual fund 
(MMMF) that was caught in a downturn spiral as the value of the collateral 
received in its repo transactions depreciated. When Reserve Primary Fund 
consequently tried to liquidate its repo positions, it “broke the buck” and its share 
price fell below $1,17 requiring a systemic intervention by the Fed to stabilize the 
whole MMMF industry.18 
                                                     
15 A peculiar use of repo contracts is the so-called “repo 105” mechanism, created by Lehman Brothers 
to push risky assets out of its balance sheets by exploiting accounting rules. For a reconstruction of the 
“repo 105” mechanism see Michael J. De La Merced & Julia Werdigier, The Origins of Lehman’s ‘Repo 105’, 
March 12, 2010, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/the-british-origins-of-lehmans-
accounting-gimmick/?_r=0; Tracy Alloway, Repo 105, FTAlphaville March 12, 2010, available at 
http://ftalphaville.ft.com//2010/03/12/173241/repo-105/. 
16 See, for instance, the case of asset back securities in the run-up to the Crisis; The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Committee: Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and 
Economic Crisis in the United States (2011), 113-115 [hereinafter Financial Crisis Inquiry Report], 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf.  
17 See Christopher Condon, Reserve Primary Money Fund Falls Below $1 a Share, Bloomberg (April 24, 2010), 
Sept. 16, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aAjlpHOSthQA. 
18 On the structure and regulation of MMMF, see John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A 
Theory of Investment Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALE L.J. 1228 (2014). On the role of MMMF in the 
Crisis and on regulatory responses see Jonathan Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market 
Mutual Funds as Substitutes for Federally Insured Deposits, 17 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 131, (2011-2012) at 133-
138, 143-151; Jeffrey N. Gordon, Perspectives on Money Market Mutual Fund Reform, Submission to the 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, U.S. Senate (June 21, 2012), 
http://www.law.columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=6217 22. In the 
aftermath of the Crisis, the SEC has extensively regulated MMMF. See SEC, Money Market Fund 
Reform, Amendments to Form PF: Final Rule, Release No. 33-9616, FR-84; File No. S7-03-13 (July 23, 
2014) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 17 C.F.R); Luis A. Aguilar, 
Commissioner, SEC, The Importance of Being Earnest About Liquidity Risk Management (Sept. 20, 2015) 
available at https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/aguilar-liquidity-risk-management.html. 
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Internationally, the Crisis wreaked havoc in global financial markets, 
triggering extensive regulatory debates on how to restore confidence and stability 
in the financial system. The collapse of Lehman; the near collapse of Bear Stearns, 
Countrywide Securities, and Reserve Primary Fund; and the subsequent domino 
effect of such events on the world’s markets were all symptoms of the financial 
system’s overarching weaknesses, and showed the vulnerabilities of the repo 
market in particular.19 The market turmoil revealed the repo market’s fragility and 
raised questions as to whether and how repos and the short-term wholesale 
funding market should be restructured or regulated, as well as what measures 
should be implemented to strengthen repo market reliability and stability. 
The US repo market, which originally developed as an over-the-counter 
(OTC) bilateral market, has expanded over time and diverged into two markets: a 
bilateral and a tri-party. In the former, two parties mutually agree to conclude a 
repo contract and arrange the transfer and management of the collateral. In the 
latter, by contrast, the parties set up a multi-party deal that is assisted and directed 
by a third entity. That entity, which is not a formal party to the contract, acts as an 
intermediary and performs all of the administrative activities connected to the 
deal, i.e., handling the loan, managing the collateral, providing (when necessary) 
intra-day liquidity, assisting the rollover of the contract, etc.20 
Significantly, the recent financial turmoil revealed structural fragilities in the 
repo market’s foundations: the features of the repo market that denote market 
failures and potential risks are connected to the current structure of the repo 
business. Such weaknesses exacerbate the risk of contagion in the financial system. 
If not promptly addressed, these weaknesses could reach systemic proportions 
and result in a new crisis for the financial system – with regulators and market 
participants being responsible, yet again, for another regulatory failure. This is 
apparent for a variety of reasons. 
First, both the bilateral and tri-party repo markets are extremely opaque. 
Although more data have recently been gathered on the tri-party repo market, the 
actual size of the web of repo transactions remains murky, especially for bilateral 
repo. From a public policy perspective, this situation limits the capacity of 
regulators to oversee the market, to assess its underlying risk, and to effectively 
intervene in the event of a crisis. From a market perspective, the lack of 
information on market participants, collateral type and exposure, and repo pricing 
reduces market efficiency by increasing the cost of risk-pricing and evaluating the 
market trends in collateral. 
                                                     
19 The study of the regulatory failures that contributed to the exacerbation of the financial crisis goes 
beyond the scope of this paper; for a comprehensive overview of “what happened” during the crisis see, 
among others, Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Getting Up to Speed on the Financial Crisis: A One-Weekend-
Reader's Guide, 50 J. ECON. LITER. 128 (2012). 
20 It is worthwhile to note that the repo market developed differently in the US than in the EU, where the 
market is relatively more structured around a financial market infrastructure. More than a third of 
European repos are in fact traded on electronic trading platforms; roughly 10% of repos are concluded in 
the tri-party market; and the majority of repo transactions are cleared through central clearing 
counterparties. 
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Second, the repo market is characterized by a high level of concentration: 
market participants are a limited group of highly interconnected players, and 
collateral clearing activities in the tri-party repo market are dominated by the 
oligopolistic position of two main clearing banks.21 The market is grounded upon 
its participants’ reputation. However, as seen during the Crisis, the absence of 
reputational buffers and safeguard mechanisms makes the market extremely 
unstable and unpredictable. The highly concentrated market, restricted access to 
new participants, and high reputational costs – both in terms of entry costs into 
the market and “punitive” exit costs – limit the efficiency and potential expansion 
of the repo market itself. 
Third, the clearing banks in the tri-party market comingle two activities that 
might result in a dangerous conflict of interest. At one level, these clearing banks 
act as big financial institutions involved in financial markets; on another level, they 
serve a “financial infrastructure” function by acting as market utilities, providing a 
“public good” to market participants. Thus, because repo clearing is performed by 
these banks, which are active participants in the financial markets, regulators are 
compelled to intervene in a crisis to save these “too big to fail” – or more 
precisely, “too important to fail” – banks from failure. Because these institutions 
know that they are too important to fail, a problem of moral hazard emerges: a 
clearing bank may decide to get involved in risky investments on the assumption 
that its role as a financial infrastructure in the repo market will guarantee a public 
rescue in any situation.  
Fourth, as described above, the repo market is prone to procyclicality and the 
risk of run, and lacks private contractual mechanisms to internalize the risk of 
panic and contagion among its participants. The lender’s ability to re-hypothecate 
the received collateral – i.e., to use the collateral to finance another transition – 
together with the exemption from “automatic stay” under the bankruptcy regime 
further exacerbate the potential instability of the repo market.  
Despite being an essential element of the plumbing of the financial system, 
the repo market is far from being immune to runs and crises. Furthermore, it has 
many elements in common with the pre-Crisis conditions of the OTC derivatives 
market and a few well-known weaknesses of the traditional banking system. Any 
new repo market reform agenda – whether it be sponsored by privately driven 
initiatives or by a public regulatory intervention – should, therefore, aim to 
increase transparency, strengthen confidence and stability in the market, contain 
systemic risks, reduce procyclicality and the risk of run, and foster competition. 
Lawmakers should look at the post-Crisis regulatory initiatives undertaken by 
private industry and public regulators to restore the stability of the derivatives 
                                                     
21 The two operating clearing banks in the tri-party repo market are J.P. Morgan Chase and Bank of New 
York Mellon. 
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market as a potential model with which to inform structural modifications to the 
repo market.22  
In the pre-Crisis scenario, institutional and structural failures resulted in the 
absence of any comprehensive or systematic oversight of the repo market and its 
participants. The repo market resides in the penumbral area at the intersection of 
banking and securities regulation. Many repo market participants were subject to 
the supervision and regulation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
while others were under the oversight of the Fed. Regulators were aware of the 
heavy reliance of financial institutions on short-term financing, but no actions 
were taken to make such financing safer.23 Similarly, in the post-Crisis agenda, the 
repo market was treated as a minor issue; most of the airtime was devoted to more 
“news-sexy” and “exotic” issues such as derivatives, bankers’ remuneration, and 
the potential breakup of big financial institutions – the “bad guys” on Wall Street. 
The Dodd-Frank Act, a massive piece of legislation that was intended to rebuild 
confidence and stability in the financial system,24 left the repo market untouched, 
but with regulators and market participants well aware of its persisting 
vulnerabilities.25  
                                                     
22 For an analysis of the pre-Crisis regulatory scenario of OTC derivatives, see Paolo Saguato Private 
Regulation in the Credit Default Swaps Market: The Role of ISDA in the New Regulatory Scenario of CDSs, in THE 
GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE 32 (Geoffrey P. Miller & Fabrizio 
Cafaggi eds., 2013), Lynn Stout, Derivatives and the Legal Origin of the 2008 Credit Crisis 1. BUS. L. REV. 1 
(2011); Dan Awrey, Complexity, Innovation and the Regulation of Modern Financial Markets, 2 HARV. BUS. L. 
REV. 235 (2012). 
23 An attempt to regulate the over-reliance on short-term funding can be found in the “liquidity coverage 
ratio” and the “net stable funding ratio” stated in the Basel III Accord, but yet not implemented in any 
states; see BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RATIO AND 
LIQUIDITY RISK (Jan. 2013), at 8-10. 
24 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203, Jul. 21, 2010, 
124 Stat. 1376 (§ 324). In the 848 pages of this piece of legislation, the phrase “repurchase agreement” 
appears only 37 times, 25 of which are found in the “Definitions” section. The only section that 
tangentially addresses the repo market is Sec. 610, which limits the amount of short-term debt a 
systemically important firm is permitted to have: ‘Lending limits applicable to credit exposure on 
derivative transactions, repurchase agreements, reverse repurchase agreements, and securities lending and 
borrowing transactions.’ 
25 See Ben. S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res., Reflections on a Year of Crisis, 
remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City's Annual Economic Symposium, Jackson Hole, 
Wyoming (Aug. 21, 2009) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090821a.htm); id., Fostering Financial 
Stability, Remarks at the 2012 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Financial Markets Conference, Stone 
Mountain, Georgia (Apr. 9, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120409a.htm); id., Some Reflections on the 
Crisis and the Policy Response, Remarks at the Russell Sage Foundation and The Century Foundation 
Conference on "Rethinking Finance," New York, New York (Apr. 13, 2012) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20120413a.htm); id., Monitoring the Financial 
System, Remarks at the 49th Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition sponsored by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois (May 10, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20130510a.htm); id., The Crisis as a Classic 
Financial Panic, Remarks at the Fourteenth Jacques Polak Annual Research Conference, Washington, D.C. 
(Nov. 8, 2013) (transcript available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20131108a.htm); Daniel K. Tarullo, 
Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res., Shadow Banking After the Financial Crisis, Remarks at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Conference on Challenges in Global Finance: The Role of Asia, 
San Francisco, California (June 12, 2012) (transcript available at 
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This paper contributes to the shadow banking system regulatory debate and 
focuses specifically on the repo market by proposing a two-step policy option to 
make the repo market more transparent, stable, and resilient. The first step is built 
on the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and European Commission (EC) initiatives 
and aims at increasing transparency in the market by requiring mandatory 
reporting of repo transactions. This solution would impose on market participants 
circumscribed macroprudential measures in terms of higher transparency, and 
would contribute to increased disclosure at the transaction level. While this would 
improve risk pricing through market participants, it would not address the delicate 
issues related to the structural and systemic fragilities of the repo market.26  
Once transparency is achieved, the second step calls for the involvement of 
the financial market infrastructure in the repo market. The financial market 
infrastructure step is modelled on some of the international principles found in 
the post-Crisis reforms of OTC derivatives and envisions a central role for trading 
venues and central clearing counterparties (CCPs) in the repo market. This step 
pushes for the clearing of standardized repos via standalone clearing utilities rather 
than clearing banks, as occurs today. Clearing repos via standalone clearing 
utilities, which perform their financial “infrastructural” activities with specific risk 
and capital requirements and effective risk management, would strengthen the 
market, increase efficiency, and consequently reduce systemic risk and contain 
liquidity risk.27 In addition, keeping these clearing entities under the supervision of 
public authorities (with the possibility of accessing public financial support in case 
of distress) would contain the risk of run and provide more stability to the whole 
financial system.28 
Standardized and centrally cleared repos should be traded in trading venues. 
This would increase the transparency of the market, reduce the entry and 
reputational costs for new market players, and reduce transactional and 
operational costs for current members because the trading venues – exchanges or 
electronic platforms – would make more pre- and post-trading information 
available to the public and to participants.  
This paper argues that reforms are necessary in order to build a safer and 
more stable repo market and encourages policymakers and the financial industry 
to learn from the progress in post-Crisis OTC derivatives regulation, in which the 
dialogue between the private and public sectors resulted in a safer and more 
transparent derivatives market. For example, in the OTC space, trade repositories 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/tarullo20120612a.htm); Timothy F. Geithner, 
Written Testimony before the House Financial Services Committee (Apr. 20, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg645.aspx). 
26 See Section V.A. 
27 See Jerome H. Powell, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res., Clearing in an Interdependent World, 
Remarks at The Clearing House Annual Conference, New York, N.Y. (Nov. 17, 2013) (transcript available 
at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/powell20151117a.htm) exploring the benefits of 
expanding central clearing for repo transactions. 
28 See Section V.B. 
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and reporting mechanisms for derivatives have been finalized; CCPs – after 
complying with new risk management and capital requirements – have begun to 
offer clearing services for a broader range of derivatives and are exploring new 
opportunities in the management of collateral.29 This is the time to learn from 
these regulatory advancements in the derivatives market, which can all be 
extended and adapted to the repo market by industry-driven initiatives and/or 
without excessive regulatory costs. 
The roadmap for this paper is as follows.  
An introduction to the repo market is put forth in Part I. Part II presents an 
overview of the repo market that highlights the market size, dynamics, and 
relationship to the larger financial system. This section will also present four case 
studies – Countrywide Securities, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Reserve 
Primary Fund – and will investigate how the repo market acted in the Crisis, what 
role it played, and how regulators and agencies acted vis-à-vis the market.  
Part III centres around the contractual aspects of a repo. Specifically, the 
paper will examine standard “boilerplate” repo agreements, namely the 2011 
Global Master Repurchase Agreement (GMPA) drafted by ICMA for the UK 
market (now the principal master agreement for all cross-border and many 
domestic repo transactions)30 and the 1996 Master Repurchase Agreement (MRA) 
drafted by the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) for 
the US repo market. The paper then analyses the legal structure and treatment of 
repo and compares it to secured loans and securities lending. Subsequently, the 
paper addresses the economic functions of the repo market and its transactions, 
focusing on its central role as a short-term liquidity provider that lubricates the 
financial mechanisms of other markets.  
Part IV identifies and analyses the structural weaknesses in the regulation and 
oversight of the repo market and the market failures that brought those 
weaknesses to light. It also considers the reasons for the regulatory inaction vis-à-
vis the repo market in the post-Crisis regulatory debate. 
The paper’s core, Part V, acknowledges the current scholarly debate and 
assesses whether there is a case for reforming or regulating the repo market. 
Specifically, Part V offers an original policy option drawn from the regulatory 
experience of the OTC derivatives market. This two-step option – which would 
promote a more sound, resilient, transparent, and effective repo market – is laid 
out along a spectrum that is built on the central roles of transparency and financial 
market infrastructure. Finally, Part VI provides some brief conclusions. 
 
 
                                                     
29 See FSB, Eighth Progress Report on Implementation of OTC Derivatives Market Reforms (Nov. 7, 2014), available 
at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2014/11/eighth-progress-report-on-implementation-of-otc-
derivatives-market-reforms/. 
30 See ICMA, Frequently Asked Questions on Repo 17-18 (May 2015), available at 
http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-
Markets/frequently-asked-questions-on-repo/ [hereinafter FAQ]. 
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I.  DIVING INTO THE “REPO” WORLD 
 
Before jumping into structural and policy analyses of the repo market, we should 
take a look at how a repo is structured.31 Imagine the following transaction 
between a securities dealer and a cash investor, in this case a MMMF: the 
securities dealer is in need of cash to finance its inventory and the MMMF is 
looking for a safe, short-term investment in which to deposit its cash reserves. 
Here is where the repo steps in. The two parties reach a deal: the securities dealer 
borrows $100 from the MMMF for a week by selling $100 worth of US Treasuries 
to the MMMF, with the sold US Treasuries acting as collateral for the transaction. 
At the same time, the securities dealer agrees to repurchase the US Treasuries 
from the MMMF for $105 after one week, with the $5 difference representing the 
interest on the principal amount of the loan – more specifically the repo rate.32 
 
 
At the end of the week, the MMMF faces three scenarios: 
1. The securities dealer repurchases the transferred US Treasuries and pays 
the agreed $105. 
2. The securities dealer and the MMMF agree to “roll over” the repo; in 
other words, they agree to refinance the positions. 
3. The securities dealer defaults on the transaction and does not repurchase 
the transferred securities. 
                                                     
31 For a detail analysis of the evolution of the US repo market, see Viral V. Acharya & Sabri Öncü, The 
Repurchase Agreement (Repo) Market, in REGULATING WALL STREET: THE DODD-FRAN ACT AND THE NEW 
ARCHITECTURE OF GLOBAL FINANCE, 319, 323-343 (Viral V. Acharya et al. eds., 2011). 
32 Id. at 312-322. 
Securities 
dealer 
MMMF 
Securities dealer sells $102 worth of securities for $100 in cash 
At maturity, the securities dealer pays $105 ($100 + $5 “interest”) in cash to 
repurchase the securities 
$105 
$102 Treasuries 
$102 Treasuries 
$100 
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If at the end of the week the securities dealer is not able to pay back the $105 
loan by re-purchasing the bonds, the MMMF keeps the property of the collateral. 
However, the MMMF could default on its obligation to return the securities at the 
maturity of the contract, in which case the securities dealer becomes entitled to 
keep the $100. Both parties, in fact, acquire the legal right to the transferred assets 
– cash and securities – which they can pledge as collateral in other transactions or 
use for any given purpose.  
Although counterparty credit risk is mitigated by the economic structure of 
the transaction and the transfer of collateral, that risk still persists in the collateral. 
The value of the transferred securities can in fact deviate from the principal value 
of the loan over the lifespan of the contract. To protect against the fluctuation risk 
of the collateral value, parties generally apply a haircut or an initial margin. Simply 
put, if the MMMF is concerned about the risk of devaluation of the securities, it 
will lend $100 to the dealer, but it will require the dealer to transfer US Treasuries 
worth $102, thereby imposing a 2% haircut on the securities. The $2 is the margin 
the MMMF requires to protect against the potential cost derived from selling the 
securities on the market, if the dealer fails to repurchase them at the maturity of 
the contract. It is also possible, although more rare, for a haircut to be applied by 
the securities dealer. This occurs when there is the potential for a rise in the value 
of the pledged collateral. In such a situation, a securities dealer would, for 
example, pledge a security worth $98 and receive $100 in loans.33 
Regarding maturity, repo transactions are generally either overnight repos or 
term repos. Overnight repos represent the majority of the US repo market and are 
generally open repos, which means that they are automatically and implicitly 
renewed – technically rolled over – until a party decides to terminate them and exit 
the deal. On the other hand, term repos – traded more often on the European 
markets – have a maturity that can last from a few days to three months. 
In conclusion, looking at the deal from the dealer’s perspective – the 
borrower’s side – we have a traditional repo, namely a sale and repurchase 
agreement. If we take the stand of the MMMF – the lender’s side – we have a so-
called reverse repo, or purchase and resale agreement. Thus, depending on the leg of 
the transaction one looks at, one can have both a repo and a reverse repo, as every 
repo is a reverse repo and vice versa.34 A more detailed analysis of repos follows in 
Section III. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
33 Id. at 321. 
34 Id. 
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II. THE REPO MARKET AND THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
 
The repo market is a large market and an essential source of liquidity for the 
financial system. Little attention, however, has been given to it in the regulatory 
and legislative spheres. In this section, I will sketch an overview of the repo 
market’s evolution and structure in the US – with a parallel overview of the EU 
scenario – that focuses on a few infrastructural aspects. I will next address 
transparency in the repo market by offering some data on its size. (Data in this 
field have typically been fragmented: only in the last ten years have data on the 
repo market been tentatively collected. However, these data provide only a partial, 
incomplete sense of the market’s real dimensions.) Finally, I will link the repo 
market to the financial crisis. I will study the cases of four financial institutions – 
Countrywide Securities, Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Reserve Primary 
Fund – that significantly relied on the repo market to fund their short-term 
positions. When the repo market froze, they were its victims.  
 
A. THE REPO MARKET: DEVELOPMENT AND DIMENSION 
 
1. How has the repo market developed? 
The repo market originally developed in an OTC scenario, in which buyers and 
sellers bilaterally agreed to conclude deals. Alongside the bilateral OTC market, 
which still constitutes part of the backbone of the whole repo market, the market 
has evolved through two additional paths: the so-called “tri-party model” and the 
“held-in-custody model”.35 In the OTC scenario, repos are privately negotiated 
and concluded bilaterally by financial institutions without the direct involvement 
of any intermediaries. Lenders and borrowers mutually agree on the terms of the 
transaction; the borrower transfers the collateral to the lender, who then transfers 
the money and becomes responsible for holding the collateral until the moment 
the transaction matures and reverses.  
The tri-party repo, on the other hand, envisages the involvement of an 
independent third party in the deal. The counterparties of the contract enter into a 
tripartite agreement with an intermediary clearing bank (in the US the two clearing 
banks active in the tri-party repo market are JP Morgan Chase36 and Bank of New 
York Mellon37), which acts as agent and administers the transaction by providing 
                                                     
35 The repo market developed both in the US and the EU, keeping very divergent market characteristics 
in each jurisdiction. In addition to the differences between the structural and operational characteristics 
of the US and EU repo markets, the two markets also present peculiarities when referring to the 
contractual structure of repos. See for example the difference in the average maturity of the contracts and 
the different legal treatment of the transfer of collateral and bankruptcy regimes, for a more detailed 
analysis see Section III. 
36 See https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/is/products/clearing. 
37 See https://www.bnymellon.com/us/en/what-we-do/solutions/index.jsp#!filter/brokerdealer-
services/us-triparty-repo-infrastructure-reform. 
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post-trading services – i.e., the selection, market-to-market, transfer, substitution, 
custody, and management of the collateral, as well as the payment and settlement 
of the cash-related legs of the deal.38 Although the concept of “clearing” might 
lead to the conclusion that the clearing bank becomes a party to the transaction, 
by novating the contract and thus becoming the buyer for the seller and the seller 
for the buyer, the clearing bank does not do so in a tri-party repo contract. Rather, 
it simply acts as an agent for the parties to a bilateral transaction without 
becoming a party to the deal.  
In contrast, the held-in-custody repo was a contractual mechanism that 
developed in the 1990s in the government securities repo market. Nowadays, it is 
less commonly used. In this contractual structure, rather than transferring the 
securities to the lender, the repo borrower holds them “in custody” at a specific 
account for the duration of the contract. This mechanism, however, is potentially 
less stable than the tri-party repo, since in the event that the borrower defaults, the 
lender will not be in possession of the collateral to cover its exposure. 
To provide a complete global overview, we need to look at both the EU and 
US repo markets: when combined, they represent more than 70% of the global 
repo market. 
The EU repo market is divided into three main segments. The first is an 
OTC repo market, which represents roughly half of the whole EU market. The 
second is an EU tri-party market, which accounts for one-fifth of the whole 
market and in which five main financial entities (Clearstream Luxembourg,39 
Euroclear,40 Bank of New York Mellon,41 JP Morgan Chase,42 and SIX43) act as 
clearing agents. The third is characterized by anonymous electronic trading via 
voice brokers and Automatic Trading Systems (ATS), in which repos are centrally 
cleared through CCPs such as LCH.Clearnet in the United Kingdom,44 
LCH.Clearnet SA in France, Eurex Clearing in Germany,45 CC&G in Italy,46 and 
MEFF in Spain.47 
                                                     
38 See ICMA, supra note 30, at 19-20. 
39 See http://www.clearstream.com/clearstream-en/products-and-services/global-securities-
financing/global-liquidity-hub-icsd-services/triparty-collateral-services---cmax-/repo--1-/triparty-repo 
(last accessed June 23, 2015). 
40 See https://www.euroclear.com/en.html (last accessed June 23, 2015). 
41 See https://www.bnymellon.com/us/en/what-we-do/solutions/index.jsp#!/us/brokerdealer-services 
(last accessed June 23, 2015). 
42 See https://www.jpmorgan.com/pages/jpmorgan/is/products/clearing/bds (last accessed June 23, 
2015). 
43 See http://www.six-securities-services.com/en/home/securities-finance/repo.html (last accessed June 
23, 2015). 
44 See http://www.lchclearnet.com/en/asset-classes/fixed-income (last accessed June 23, 2015). 
45 Eurex Clearing is owned by Deutsche Borse AG; see http://www.eurexclearing.com/clearing-
en/cleared-markets/eurex-repo (last accessed June 23, 2015). 
46 CC&G is the Cassa di Compensazione e Garanzia, which is part of the London Stick Exchange group; 
see http://www.lseg.com/post-trade-services/ccp-services/ccg/products-and-services (last accessed June 
23, 2015). 
47 MEFF stands for Mercado Español de Futuros Financieros; see 
http://www.meff.es/aspx/Comun/Pagina.aspx?l1=Repo&f=Home&id=ing (last accessed June 23, 
2015). 
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In contrast to a clearing bank in the tri-party repo market, a CCP is a party to 
the transaction. Once the lender and the borrower agree on the terms of the repo, 
they register with a CCP, which novates the contract and becomes the buyer to 
the seller and the seller to the buyer.48 Through the novation of the original 
agreed-upon repo, the CCP becomes the counterparty of each of the original 
parties, which then rely on the CCP for the performance of the contract. 
 
2. How big is the repo market? Data from the EU and the US 
While on the one hand, we know how and in what directions the repo market has 
developed, on the other, we lack precise and uniform information about the actual 
size of the repo market. Industry-driven initiatives make the European and British 
repo markets slightly more transparent than the American one,49 for which the 
data set is incomplete. In the section, I provide an estimate – though necessarily 
incomplete – of the size of the US repo market, focusing on the market 
movements in the years following the Crisis. 
In Europe, the ICMA European Repo Council – the industry forum for repo 
dealers in the EU – has been collecting voluntary semi-annual data on the 
European repo market since 2001.50 Its last survey, which was published in June 
2015,51 calculated the total gross value of outstanding repo contracts in the repo 
dealers’ books to be $6.345 trillion.52 This represents an increase from the $6.034 
trillion registered during the “hot semester” of the financial crisis (fall and winter 
2008),53 but a significant decrease from the $10.121 trillion reported in June 
2008.54 The EU repo market had almost doubled in size in the six years prior to 
the Crisis.55 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
48 In the repo scenario, the CCP becomes the lender to the borrower and the borrower to the lender. 
49 See http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-
Markets/repo/ (last access June 23, 2015). 
50 ‘The values measured by the survey are gross figures, which mean they have not been adjusted for the 
double counting of the same transactions between pairs of survey participants. However, a study […] 
suggested that the problem of double-counting was not very significant.’ Id. at 9. Moreover, the values do 
not include the amount of repo transactions concluded with central banks as part of monetary policy 
operations. See id. 
51 See ICMA, ICMA European repo market survey number 29 conducted June 2015, available at 
http://www.icmagroup.org/Regulatory-Policy-and-Market-Practice/short-term-markets/Repo-
Markets/repo/latest/. 
52 The original amount reported is EUR 5,612 billion, see id. at 8. To convert the amount in EU euro to 
dollar, I applied the historic exchange rate EUR-$ reported by the Fed 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/hist/dat00_eu.htm) at the day the data were collected. 
53 The original amount reported is EUR 6,504 billion, see ICMA, supra note 51, at 8. 
54 The original amount reported is EUR 4,633 billion, id. at 8. 
55 If however, we look at the nominal amount in EUR, the EU repo market had its pick in June 2007, 
reaching EUR 6,775, and plummeting to its lowest point in December 2007, with EUR 4,633 billion, id. 
at 8. 
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The EU repo market size in trillions ($)56 
 
 
 
By breaking up the aggregated data, the survey shows that more than 57% of 
European repos are traded OTC and are direct bilateral or tri-party repos, with the 
latter accounting only for 10% of the market. On the other hand, more than 31% 
of outstanding repo transactions are electronically traded on ATS in Europe,57 
with the remaining portion of transactions concluded via voice brokers, and 30% 
of all EU repos are centrally cleared through CCPs.58  
Looking at the composition of the collateral used in tri-party repo 
transactions, we see that government securities (including those issued by public 
agencies and sub-national governments) account for roughly 50% of the collateral, 
and that 77% of those are EU-originated securities.59 In terms of maturity, one-
quarter of EU repos are overnight transactions; approximately 30% have a 
maturity of one month or less; and the remaining have up to a year or more of 
open repo (i.e., repo with no fixed maturity that can be closed at will).60 
Finally, the annual Eurozone money market data survey, published by the 
European Central Bank (ECB),61 gathers information on the development of the 
Eurozone money market, excluding the British and Swiss markets. These data 
show that in the Eurozone repo market, centrally cleared repo transactions 
account for more than 66% of the total secured market, with tri-party repos 
limited to 9%. 
                                                     
56 See ICMA, supra note 51. 
57 The most common electronic trading platforms for repos in Europe are BrokerTec 
(http://www.brokertec.com/, last accessed June 23, 2015), Eurex Repo 
(http://www.eurexrepo.com/repo-en/, last accessed June 23, 2015), and MTS 
(http://www.mtsmarkets.com/Products/MTS-Repo, last accessed June 23, 2015). 
58 See ICMA, supra note 30, at 25. 
59 See ICMA, supra note 51, at 15-18. 
60 Id. 
61 See ECB, Euro Money Market Survey (Oct. 2014), available at 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/money/mmss/html/index.en.html.  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
Ju
n
-0
1
M
ar
-0
2
D
ec
-0
2
S
ep
-0
3
Ju
n
-0
4
M
ar
-0
5
D
ec
-0
5
S
ep
-0
6
Ju
n
-0
7
M
ar
-0
8
D
ec
-0
8
S
ep
-0
9
Ju
n
-1
0
M
ar
-1
1
D
ec
-1
1
S
ep
-1
2
Ju
n
-1
3
M
ar
-1
4
D
ec
-1
4
T
ri
ll
io
n
s 
($
) 
                        21/2015 
 
 18 
At first glance, the European repo market seems to be characterized by the 
active presence of financial market infrastructure. Repo transactions are largely 
traded on electronic venues and then centrally cleared via CCPs. The tri-party 
segment of the repo market is limited, and competition among clearing services is 
fostered by the presence of five main tri-party agents.62 
Sketching a picture of the European repo market, even a “guesstimate”, is a 
useful exercise for the purpose of better understanding and evaluating the US 
market. As mentioned earlier, the US repo market has structurally developed along 
two main paths: the OTC bilateral market and the tri-party market. In contrast to 
the EU scenario, however, until very recently there were almost no private 
industry-driven initiatives to collect data on the actual size of the repo market.63 
The lack of comprehensive, detailed data on the repo market was clear during and 
in the immediate aftermath of the Crisis, which revealed significant data gaps in 
the public regulatory and supervisory arenas.64 The only publicly available data on 
repos were – and to some extent still are – collected by the Fed and reflect the 
number of financing arrangements of government securities dealers using 
repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements.65 
With regard to the US bilateral repo market, because of the exclusive 
operation in the OTC framework and the lack of financial infrastructure or market 
utility operating in this area, there is little or no information on its actual size. In 
July 2014, researchers from the NY Fed – stressing the importance of having data 
on the repo market – published a study that presents an estimate of the size and 
composition of the US bilateral repo market.66 Beginning with the data submitted 
by primary dealers67 on their total repo activities, the NY Fed researchers took 
that data – organized according to collateral type – and subtracted from it the 
activity of the tri-party repo market. From this calculation, they obtained an 
estimate of the amount of collateral financed in the bilateral repo market, which 
came to $1.897 trillion.68 Notably, this study shows that as of October 8, 2014, US 
                                                     
62 See ICMA, supra note 51, at 15-18. 
63 The Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) has published aggregated data on 
the repo market since mid-2010; see http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx. 
64 See Adam Copeland et al., Mapping and Sizing the U.S. Repo Market, LIBERTY STREET ECONOMICS, (June 
25, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2012/06/mapping-and-sizing-the-us-
repo-market.html#.VZ_aub3D_cs.  
65 These data are reported weekly by primary dealers using forms FR 2004A/B/C; the aggregated data are 
available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/reportingforms/FR_2004A_B_C.html (last accessed 
July 6, 2015). 
66 See Adam Copeland et al., Lifting the Veil on the U.S. Bilateral Repo Market, LIBERTY STREET ECONOMICS, 
(July 09, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2014/07/lifting-the-veil-on-the-
us-bilateral-repo-market.html#.VZ7X5r3D_cs.  
67 Primary dealers are banks and broker-dealers that may trade in US government securities directly with 
the NY Fed and which serve as counterparties of the NY Fed in tis implementation of monetary policy; 
see Primary Dealers List at http://www.ny.frb.org/markets/pridealers_current.html (last access, Oct. 5, 
2015).  
68 In order to produce this estimate, the authors took the FR2004 data on primary dealer activities in repo 
(these forms are submitted weekly by all primary dealers and reflect their market activity in all collateral 
classes; these data are confidential and not publicly available); subtracted from the total amount the 
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Treasury securities accounted for almost 80% of the collateral posted in bilateral 
repos, while accounting for only a little over 40% of tri-party repos. Official 
statistics on the overall size of the pre-Crisis repo market are not available; 
however, in one of their seminal works, Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick 
approximated the US repo market during the peak of the crisis at $10-$12 trillion 
– a sum that made it roughly the same size as the $10 trillion US banking system at 
that time.69 This figure could, however, include a double counting of repo and 
reverse repo transactions.  
There are a few data collection mechanisms currently operating in the US; 
however, the picture that they provide to regulators and participants is incomplete 
and often confusing. In trying to map the sources of data on the repo market, we 
see quite an intricate scenario. The Fed publishes statistical data on the flow of 
funds (the aggregate assets and liabilities for financial and non-financial sectors), 
which reflect information on repos and federal funds. The Financial Stability 
Oversight Council (FSOC) annually provides statistics on the total size of tri-party 
repo transactions concluded by primary dealers.70 Only in the last five years has 
the NY Fed – together with the Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform Task 
Force71 – set up a statistical dataset of the monthly market value of tri-party repos 
in the US, which reflects the value of the “entire population” of repo transactions 
for which the two clearing banks serve as agents.72 These statistics offer 
disaggregated data by collateral used in the transaction and provide information on 
the haircut applied to the collateral.73 On the market side, SIFMA collects and 
publishes updated monthly data on the tri-party repo market’s size, with additional 
aggregated data on the collateral most widely used in the market.74 The last 
available survey, as of June 2015, quantifies the US tri-party repo market at $1.583  
trillion. Of all the trades, 40.1% had US Treasury securities as collateral, 
36.4% had agencies securities, and the remaining 23.5% had equity and other 
securities.   
                                                                                                                                      
amount of tri-party repo funding (data on tri-party repo funding are available in aggregated form and 
reflect the whole market size – the authors adjusted that number, extrapolating only the tri-party repo 
activity of the primary dealers, on the assumption that primary dealer make up a little less than 80% of all 
repos in the US); and then calculated the amount of funds received. See Copeland et al., supra note 66. 
69 See Gorton & Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on the Repo, supra note 7, at 433.  
70 See FSOC, Annual Report 2015, available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/studies-
reports/Documents/2015%20FSOC%20Annual%20Report.pdf.  
71 The Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform Task Force is an industry private-sector body set up in the 
aftermath of the Crisis under the auspices of the Payments Risk Committee and sponsored by the NY 
Fed, with the task of addressing the weakness of the repo market. The Task Force includes 
representatives from multiple types of market participants in the tri-party repo market – clearing banks, 
dealers, investors, hedge funds, market utilities, and industry groups. For more information see 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/tripartyrepo/. 
72 See Explanatory Notes to the Summary Statistics for the U.S. Tri-Party Repo Market, available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/tripartyrepo/pdf/explanatory_notes.pdf (last access, July 7, 2015). 
73 See NY Fed, Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform, available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/tpr_infr_reform.html. 
74 See SIFMA, US GCF Repo Index, Tri-party Repo, and Primary Dealer Financing (Repo/Reverse 
Repo), available at http://www.sifma.org/research/statistics.aspx.  
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A growing but still relatively small segment of the US repo market is the 
General Collateral Finance (GCF) repo market.75 Introduced in 1998 by the Fixed 
Income Clearing Corporation (FICC), a subsidiary of the DTCC, to reduce 
transaction costs for securities dealers in the inter-dealers repo market, GCF repos 
are standardized repo transactions. They are anonymously traded through inter-
dealer brokers and centrally cleared by the FICC, which operates as a central 
counterparty. By acting as a CCP, the FICC delivers the cash to the borrower and 
collects and manages the collateral for the lender. A peculiarity of GCF repos is 
the fact that they use high-quality securities as collateral for deals. According to 
the latest data collected by the NY Fed, the nominal value of GCF repos netted 
and traded as of June 2015 amounted to $584.43 billion, 40% of which is 
represented by overnight repo and 60% by term repo. Looking at the activity of 
FICC, the total amount of cash provided to borrowers amounted to $140.8 
billion, with $178.7 billion in securities received as collateral.  
 
The US repo market size in trillions ($)76 
 
 
In summary: on the basis of the data collected, we can estimate the current 
total value of the US repo market to be between $3.5 and $4 trillion.77 This 
number is simply an approximation based on the fragmented data currently 
                                                     
75 A GCF repo is a repo transaction that refers to a range of assets – generally high-quality collateral – 
that are accepted as collateral by the majority of intermediaries in the repo market.  
See ICMA, supra note 58, at 11. 
76 See NY Fed, supra note 73. 
77 See Copeland, supra note 66; Victoria Baklanova, Repo and Securities Lending: Improving Transparency with 
Better Data, Office of financial Research Brief Series, 15-03 (Apr. 23, 2015), available at 
http://financialresearch.gov/briefs/files/OFRbr-2015-03-repo-sec-lending.pdf.  
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publicly available. What can be clearly stated is that the repo market is relevant to 
the financial market, and, as such, it deserves serious analytical and critical analysis. 
 
B. THE 2007-2009 FINANCIAL CRISIS: WHAT ROLE DID THE REPO MARKET PLAY 
AND HOW WAS IT AFFECTED? 
 
The general narrative on the causes of the Crisis and its systemic propagation 
mainly includes the real estate asset bubble, the boom in the subprime mortgage 
market, the exponential growth of securitization and debt-finance structured 
products (collateralized debt obligations, asset back securities, and mortgage back 
securities), and the explosion in use of OTC derivatives such as credit default 
swaps.78 Little attention, however, has been paid to the repo market, which is 
relatively small when compared to the hundred trillion-dollar OTC derivatives 
market.79 
If the financial market were an engine, the repo market – which has grown 
rapidly since the early 2000s80 – would be its transmission belt. Yet, as with 
engines, people start looking at internal mechanisms only when the car stops 
running. In this case, private and public market actors began to realize the 
importance of the repo market only when it stopped working properly, i.e., when 
a liquidity crunch was already happening.  
 
1. Countrywide Securities: The first cracks in the repo building 
The first fissures in the repo market occurred in the summer of 2007, when 
Countrywide Securities (Countrywide) showed alarming signs of structural 
fragility.81 As former Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner stated: ‘Countrywide 
wasn’t on [the] radar screen [of the US Treasury] until shortly before the night of 
August 15, when it nearly paralyzed the entire system.’82 That day, the largest 
subprime mortgage lender in the US revealed the fragility of its funding 
structure.83 The firm relied heavily on ‘unstable, runnable short-term funding. The 
firm raised much of its operating cash by issuing “commercial paper,” [… and] 
also financed itself through a complex market known as “tri-party repo.’”84 That 
                                                     
78 For a critical review on a few relevant pieces of the post-crisis literature on the Crisis, Adam J. Levitin, 
The Politics of Financial Regulation and the Regulation of Financial Politics: A Review Essay – Reform 
efforts need to focus on taming politics, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1991 (2014).  
79 Statistics from the Bank for International Settlement set the OTC derivatives market to approximately 
$670 trillion in gross market value; see http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm.  
80 See Peter Hördahl and Michael R. King, Developments in Repo Markets During the Financial Turmoil, 37 
BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENT Q. REV. 37 (2008) arguing that ‘repo markets have doubled in size since 
2002, with gross amount outstanding at yearend 2007 of roughly $10 trillion in each of the Us and euro 
repo markets, and another $1 trillion in the UK repo market.’ 
81 See CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 16, at 248-250, which analyses Countrywide’s liquidity crisis and 
incapacity to use mortgage securities as collateral in repo transactions. 
82 TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, supra note 3. 
83 Id. at 122. 
84 Id. at 123. 
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night, once the market sensed Countrywide’s structural vulnerabilities,85 some of 
its lenders refused to roll over its commercial papers – causing its most important 
source of cash to dry up. Furthermore, Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM), the 
firm’s tri-party repo clearing bank, threatened ‘not to “unwind” the firm’s $45 
billion repo book the next morning,’86 warning Countrywide’s cash lenders about 
the firm’s potential and imminent risk of default on its repo transactions, as well 
as the consequent transfer of securities pledged as collateral. A decision on the 
part of BNYM not to “unwind” Countrywide’s repo portfolio would have 
triggered four main consequences in the market: (1) loss of confidence in 
Countrywide as a financial institution; (2) loss of confidence in other similar 
institutions that financed their short-term liquidity by repoing the same classes of 
securities; (3) loss of confidence in tri-party repo market mechanisms; and (4) risk 
of a “fire sale” of the pledged assets as cash lenders tried to realize the value of the 
collateral with sales. As Secretary Geithner described in the memoir of his time at 
the Treasury Department, the night of August 15, 2007 was a night of intense 
negotiations between BNYM, Countrywide executives, and officials from the 
Treasury and the Fed. Negotiations terminated with BNYM agreeing to unwind 
Countrywide’s repo portfolio, provided that the pledged collateral were 
upgraded.87 
This episode, despite occurring during the very early stages of the financial 
crisis, ‘revealed […] how dependent the entire financial system [was] on short term 
financial funding agreement[s]. […] [A]nd it showed that this fragility extended 
even to the secured funding markets – where lending decisions […][are] based on 
the borrower’s collateral rather than just its underlying creditworthiness’88 
 
2. Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and the collapse: The repo market freeze and the 
Fed’s response 
In the spring and fall of 2008, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were the two 
main victims of over-reliance on the repo market as a source of operational 
liquidity. As described above, an effective repo market requires high reputational 
standards and confidence among market participants, highly liquid and safe assets 
pledged as collateral by borrowers, and the presence of reliable operational 
mechanisms. When one of these elements is missing, the whole structure falters. 
With Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers relying heavily on overnight repo 
financing in order to operate,89 two of those elements (high-quality collateral and 
                                                     
85 See id. at 124-125: ‘on the 15th, with the price of Countrywide’s debt against default up eightfold in just 
a month, a previously bullish Merrill Lynch analyst issued a report titled “Liquidity is the Achilles’ Heel,” 
warning that cash pressures could force countrywide into bankruptcy.’ 
86 Id. at 124. 
87 Id. at 126. Add a sentence/comment on the similitude with public-private approach in the rescue of 
LTCM lead by the government but put in place by private institutions. 
88 Id. at 127. 
89 Id. at 161. 
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reliable operational mechanisms) were missing.90 This then induced repo lenders 
to question the financial stability of these institutions and doubt whether they 
should continue providing them with liquidity. As mentioned above, the US repo 
market expanded its reach to more volatile, less liquid securities (e.g., CDO, ABS, 
and MBS) rather than focusing on US government securities. However, as the 
subprime mortgage market and its related structured products91 began 
deteriorating, the US repo market started to face serious problems. Following the 
burst of the housing bubble and the subprime crisis, first, the value and liquidity 
of the pledged collateral – CDO, MBS, and ABS – plunged. Then, once the repo 
counterparties of the two firms became aware of the exposure of these institutions 
to short-term financing and structured financial products, they began to cast 
doubt on their financial stability, reliability, and operational capacity.92 These two 
events, in combination with the heightened sense of insecurity and loss of 
confidence among market participants, resulted in a drain of the liquidity supply in 
the repo market.93  
Lenders became unwilling to enter into transactions with risky counterparties 
and, more seriously, they stopped rolling over their repo financing to Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers. While during the first stages of the Crisis repo lenders were 
still willing to provide repo financing on Treasury bills, when the panic spread 
they refused to roll over repo transactions backed by those bills. As the number 
and type of securities that could be accepted as collateral by repo lenders 
decreased, and as market participants began to question the liquidity and reliability 
of Treasury bills, the repo market froze. One of the proximate causes of the entire 
Crisis was the inability of Lehman Brothers to roll over its overnight securities 
loans through the repo market, along with its inability to borrow cash to finance it 
securities inventory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
90 See Skeel, supra note 4, at 31-33, 60-61; Gillian Tett, Fool’s Gold – The Inside Story of J.P. Morgan and 
How Wall Street Greet Corrupted Its Bold Dream and Created a Financial Catastrophe (2010), “Bear’s 
real Achilles’ heel was its funding base”, id. at 217. 
91 Structure products are synthetic investment instruments in which the payoff is connected to the 
performance of specific assets or indexes. 
92 For example, see FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 81, at 284, 288, which discusses the 
unwillingness of several MMMFs to roll over Bear in the run-up to Bear’s liquidity crisis and sale to 
JPMC. 
93 See Geithner, supra note 3; in describing the Bear situation, Secretary Geithner said: ‘the real lesson of 
Bear was that in a world of extreme leverage and short term financing, confidence can vanish in a 
heartbeat, and liquidity along with it.’ 
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Lehman Brother's Tri-Party Repo Book by Collateral Type94 
 
 
When the run on the repo market occurred, the main victims were the repo 
dealers who suddenly came up short in liquidity with which to finance their 
investments and business operations. After an initial liquidity injection of $25 
billion by the NY Fed,95 Bear Stearns was sold on March 18, 2008 and merged 
with JP Morgan Chase – its main repo clearing bank – in a deal assisted and 
sponsored by the Fed.96 Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection on September 15, 2008.97 Lehman Brothers, which was burdened by 
more than $600 billion in debt, was the largest bankruptcy filing in US history.98 
                                                     
94 Copeland et al., supra note 64 at 57.  
95 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, JP Morgan Pays $2 a Share for Bear Stearns, March 17, 2009, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/17/business/17bear.html?_r=0. 
96 See Yalman Onaran, Fed Aided Bear Stearns as Firm Faced Chapter 11, Bernanke Says, April 2, 2008 
13:20 EDT, available at 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=worldwide&sid=a7coicThgaEE. 
97 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, The Race to Save Lehman Brother, N.Y. Times (Oct. 20, 2009) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/20/business/economy/20sorkin.html?pagewanted=all. 
98 See Sam Mamudi, Lehman folds with record $613 billion debt, (Sept 15, 2008) available at 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/lehman-folds-with-record-613-billion-debt?siteid=rss. 
The massive post-Crisis Lehman litigation revealed a peculiar use of repos other than their traditional 
lending purpose. Literally following the legal definition of a repo as a sale and repurchase agreement, and 
spotting a flaw in the accounting rules, Lehman set up a set of so-called “Repo 105” transactions. In a 
traditional repo, the lender generally applies a haircut on the transferred collateral to reflect and 
compensate for the potential liquidation, transactional, and operational costs. Such a haircut, however, is 
conventionally in the range of a maximum of 3% of the value of the collateral. In the Repo 105, Lehman 
was posting collateral with a high enough haircut that the transaction was considered – in terms of 
accounting rules – a real sale of assets rather than a loan. Thus, Lehman was able to sell out (“hide”) a 
significant amount of its liabilities from its balance sheets ($50 billion worth of risky structured products) 
just by entering into 105 repos. See Michael Bridge & Jo Braithwaite, Private Law and Financial Crises, 13(2) 
J. OF CORP. L. STUD. 361 (2013). 
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After the collapse of two of the largest broker-dealers on Wall Street, repo 
lenders were trapped with a significant amount of collateral that was supposed to 
be repurchased by the defaulted repo borrowers. As repo lenders needed to 
refinance their cash accounts and cover their exposure on the defaulted repo 
transactions, they tried to liquidate the pledged assets, flooding the market with 
securities. In this distressed market scenario, as repo lenders tried to recoup any 
value they could from their already devaluated collateral, they heavily discounted 
the price of the securities they were holding. This “fire sale”99 triggered further 
panic in the markets, with asset prices caught in a downward spiral.100  
A secondhand victim of the “fire sale” in the repo market was Reserve 
Primary Fund (RPF), one of the largest MMMFs in the US. RPF – which was 
heavily exposed in Lehman Brothers’ commercial papers and which was active in 
repo market lending – suffered a run of its investors when they became aware of 
the unsecured exposure to Lehman Brothers and then RPF “broke the buck” the 
day after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy.101 This event triggered a run on 
other MMMFs, which consequently had to drastically reduce the amount of cash 
outflows invested in the repo market in order to meet their clients’ demands. 
Thus, the repo market was not only affected by the financial crisis, but also 
ended up being a propagative mechanism that seriously exacerbated that crisis. As 
one of the main liquidity pipes in the financial system, once it froze, the entire 
market suffered the consequences. As the value of the assets pledged as collateral 
in many repo transactions began to decline, repo investors asked for higher 
haircuts – requiring dealers to post additional collateral – and even refused to roll 
over their repos at maturity. The spike in the amount of the haircuts requested for 
many asset classes,102 coupled with a market-wide downward spiral in asset prices, 
made short-term funding too expensive for securities dealers. It also made it too 
risky and too costly for cash investors. This resulted in a freeze in the repo market, 
as repo borrowers were not able to borrow anymore and repo lenders were not 
willing to lend or were more cautious in lending. Only the intervention of the Fed, 
with its swap programs and liquidity facilities – the Term Securities Lending 
Facility (TSLF)103 and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF)104 – was able to 
                                                     
99 “Fire sale” has been defined by Shleifer and Vishny as the forced sale of an asset at a dislocated price; 
see Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, Liquidation Value and Debt Capacity: A Market Equilibrium 
Approach, 47(4) J. FIN. 1343. 
100 See Brian Begalle et al., The Risk of fire Sales in the Tri-Party Repo Market, NY Fed Staff Report No. 616, 
May 2013, available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff_reports/sr616.pdf, at 9. 
101 The idea of “breaking the buck” is commonly used in the mutual funds industry to refer to a situation 
in which a fund’s net asset value (NAV) falls below the par value of $1. More specifically, since MMMFs 
offer stable NAV and can at any time redeem their investment/deposit at par value, when the NAV falls 
below $1, MMMFs experience a run. This is what happened to RPF when Lehman filed for bankruptcy.  
102 See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Haircut, Yale ICF Working Paper No. 09-15 (May 12, 2010), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1447438. 
103 See Michael J. Flemign et al., The Term Securities Lending Facility: Origin, Design, and Effect, 15(2) CURRENT 
ISSUES IN ECON. AND FIN. 1 (Feb. 2009), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci15-2.html; Geithner, supra note 82, at 146; 
information and data on the activity of the TSLF are available at 
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break the ice inside the repo plumbing and permit liquidity to circulate again 
through the repo market. Both programs, which were implemented within a week 
of each other at the height of the Bear Stearns crisis, were temporary measures 
intended to sustain and promote liquidity in the funding markets and improve the 
overall performance of the financial system. The Fed decided to intervene both on 
the collateral supply side – to contain the risk of “fire sales” – and on the cash 
supply side – to support the liquidity demands of market participants.  
The TSLF was a temporary collateral swap facility that promoted liquidity in 
Treasury bills and other asset markets. The program, established under the Fed’s 
emergency lending power, was open to all primary dealers, allowing them to 
borrow US Treasury securities by pledging as collateral other securities, such as 
MBS, agency debt securities, and investment-grade debt securities.105 The TSLF 
successfully attempted to increase the ability of dealers to obtain funding via 
collateralized financing and to prevent dealers from “fire selling” assets in an 
illiquid market.106 Operating as an auction facility, the TSFL offered ‘to lend general 
Treasury collateral against pledges of other fixed-income collateral’ on a weekly 
basis.107 The TSLF charged a minimum fee for the performance of this 
operation108 and imposed a haircut on the securities pledged by the dealers in 
order to protect against counterparty and credit risk. 
The other important Fed program, the PDCF, aimed to support the liquidity 
needs of primary dealers. Established at the NY Fed, the PDCF allowed primary 
dealers to borrow from the NY Fed on a collateral basis in times of market 
distress. Simply put, the PDCF provided primary dealers with the same services 
that the Fed discount window provides to depository institutions, i.e. a backstop 
source of liquidity.109 The PDCF program allowed primary dealers to obtain 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_tslf.htm, and 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/tslf.html.  
104 See Tobias Adrian et al., The Federal Reserve’ Primary Dealer Credit Facility, 15(4) CURRENT ISSUES IN 
ECON. AND FIN. 1 (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/current_issues/ci15-
4.html; Geithner, supra note 59, at 146; information and data on the activity of the PDCF are available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/reform_pdcf.htm/, and 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/pdcf.html.  
105 See Fleming et al., supra note 103, at 3. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 5. 
108 The fee charged by the TSLF was set at a level somewhat higher than the interest charged for the 
borrowing of Treasury securities against program-eligible collateral by the private market under normal 
circumstances; see id. The rationale for this fee was to make the TSLF appealing to dealers only when the 
markets were in a distressed situation. 
109 BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: LECTURES BY BEN S. 
BERNANKE 4-6 (2013). Generally on the Fed’s Discount Window Lending Programs, see Frequently Asked 
Questions - Discount Window Lending Programs, FED. RES. DISCOUNT WINDOW & PAYMENT SYS. RISK, 
http://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/dwfaqs.cfm?hdrID=14&dtlID=75 (last visited Oct. 3, 2015). The 
Fed can operate as a lender of last resort via two mechanisms: Section 10B and Section 13(3) of the 
Federal Reserve Act. Section 10B – 12 U.S.C. §347b – confers the power to the Fed to extend loans to 
the member banks, what is generally refers to as Discount Window. Section 13(3) – 12 U.S.C. §343 – 
extends the Fed’s power to provide liquidity to entities others than members bank ‘in unusual and exigent 
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liquidity against any collateral deemed acceptable by clearing banks in the tri-party 
market, which included MBS, ABS, municipal securities, and investment-grade 
corporate securities.110 The NY Fed charged interest on the amount lent – the so-
called “discount rate” – which, in a normal market scenario, would be higher than 
the overnight repo rate. 
Both of the Fed’s programs began operations during the worst days of the 
Bear Stearns crisis and supported the repo market until February 1, 2010, when 
they were dismantled. The Fed’s intervention was crucial in sustaining the liquidity 
of the financial markets. Operating on the supply side for liquidity and safe 
collateral, the Fed was able to act as a reliable substitute source of liquidity for the 
collapsed repo market and to contain the “fire sales” of troubled assets. In this 
way, the Fed supported investment banks and broker dealers in their funding 
activities. What made the Fed’s intervention necessary was the absence of public 
safety nets and the inaccessibility of the Fed’s discount window mechanisms to 
investment banks, broker-dealers, and “shadow banking” entities more broadly.111 
 
 
 
III. WHAT IS A REPO? LEGAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE 
 
A. THE LEGAL STRUCTURE OF A REPO: NEITHER A SECURED LOAN NOR SECURITIES 
LENDING 
 
A repo is a two-leg bilateral contract in which a sale of securities is coupled with a 
repurchase agreement. In the first leg of the transaction, the seller transfers 
securities112 to the buyer at a fixed time and at a determined price. The second leg 
of the deal is a simultaneous agreement whereby the buyer agrees to sell the 
securities back to the seller and the seller agrees to repurchase them at a future 
date or on demand.113 The difference between the repurchase price and the price 
originally paid by the buyer is the interest the buyer has to pay in order to borrow 
                                                                                                                                      
circumstances … [when the entity can prove to be] unable to secure adequate credit accommodations 
from other banking institutions.’ 
110 See Adrian, supra note 104, at 3-4, 5. 
111 The NY Fed is still operating in the repo market as an active player. The Open Market Trading Desk 
at the NY Fed ‘implements monetary policy for the Federal Reserve System at the behest of the Federal 
Open Market Committee.’ In doing so, the NY Fed uses repo to make collateralized loans to primary 
dealers; and conversely borrow money from primary dealers via reverse repos. ‘Repos and reverse repos 
are conducted with primary dealers via auction. In a repo, dealers bid on borrowing money versus various 
types of general collateral. In a reverse repo, dealers offer interest rates at which they would lend money 
to the Fed versus the Fed's Treasury general collateral, typically Treasury bills.’ See N.Y. Fed., Repurchase 
and Reverse Repurchase Transactions (Aug. 2007), available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed04.html.  
112 Generally, the securities used in a repo transaction are fixed-income financial instruments – such as 
Treasury bills, mortgage-backed securities, sovereign bonds, and corporate bonds – but they can also be 
equities. 
113 See Sec. 1, 2012 Global Master Repurchase Agreement. 
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from the seller. This price differential is expressed in percentage points, and on an 
annual basis is generally called the “repo rate”.114 
 The transferred securities operate as collateral in the transaction and 
contribute to mitigating the counterparty credit risks borne by the buyer. In fact, 
upon conclusion of the contract, the buyer acquires the full legal title to the 
securities. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, however, the seller maintains the 
beneficial ownership of the securities, i.e., any income payment generated by the 
collateral must be returned to the seller.115 In the event that the seller defaults and 
fails to repurchase the securities at the termination date or upon the buyer’s 
demand, the buyer can keep the ownership of the securities and can sell them to 
cover its exposure on the transaction.  
With regard to typical repo transaction maturity, a repo can either be subject 
to a term or fixed maturity date – typically a short-term, i.e., overnight, transaction 
– or parties can agree to conclude a so-called “open” or “open-ended” term repo, 
in which no maturity date is fixed and either party has “on demand” rights to 
terminate the contract by notifying the counterparty on any date that it finds 
convenient. If the repo does not have a fixed maturity date or is not open, the 
repo automatically rolls over every day. 
Usually, repos last overnight. They can also be structured with longer 
maturity as short-dated repos (with weekly or monthly maturity, up to a maximum 
of three months) or as term repos (a less common variant with annual maturity). A 
very important aspect of a repo transaction is the right of the parties to extend the 
duration of the deal by renewing the contract at termination date. Technically, the 
extension of a repo is called a “rollover”, in which parties agree to substitute the 
matured deal with a new one that can either replicate the previous one or adjust 
the original contractual terms.  
Significantly, the whole repo transaction is built around the transferred 
securities, which operate as collateral for the stability of the deal. Legally, and 
because of the structure of the transaction, the transferred securities are 
simultaneously the object of the contract and its collateral. Furthermore, the 
contract comprises the right of the buyer to finance its purchase by reversing out 
the very same received collateral, or “re-hypothecating”. In this instance, the buyer 
pledges the securities in another repo, earning a profit from the gap between the 
rate of the original repo and that of the reverse repo. Re-hypothecation of 
collateral is quite common in repo agreements.116  
A repo’s underlying securities are generally high-quality. Although high-
quality government bonds are the most common collateral on the repo market, 
there are also corporate bonds, mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed 
securities, and equities. A repo can be built around two main collateral structures: 
                                                     
114 The repo rate reflects the riskiness of the transaction, the quality of the collateral, the liquidity of the 
collateral, etc. 
115 See Sec. 5, 2012 Global Master Repurchase Agreement. 
116 Re-hypothecation is the use of pledged collateral as collateral in a transaction with a third party.  
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general collateral repo and special collateral repo. The difference between the two 
types of repo depends on the type and quality of the underlying security. In a 
general repo contract, the parties refer to a basket of high-quality liquid assets that 
can be accepted in the transaction and ease the collateral substitution mechanisms 
by providing a more diversified set of underlying assets. In a special collateral 
repo, the parties want a specific asset to be the object of the deal. Whether the 
parties choose to engage in a general or special collateral repo depends on their 
goals. If they want to use the contract as a stable and sound financing mechanism, 
they opt for the general repo; if they need specific securities because of a particular 
asset’s intrinsic characteristics or because of the peculiar financial or investment 
interests and strategies of the buyer, they opt for the special repo. 
The analysis of the type of assets commonly traded in the repo market shows 
that parties look for securities that pose low counterparty and/or liquidation risks. 
In addition, when determining the purchase price of the securities, the buyer 
wants the price to reflect all of the potential risks underlying the transactions. The 
aggregation of these risks is reflected in the valuation of the securities pledged as 
collateral. Generally, collateral is commonly valuated below its market value at the 
time a repo is concluded in order to incorporate and reflect the counterparty risk, 
operational risk, legal risk, and liquidation risk of the collateral in the event of 
default.117 The spread between the market value of the transferred securities and 
the purchase price is called the “haircut”.118 
A repo can be deconstructed into two sequences: repo and reverse repo. 
From the standpoint of the securities seller, which borrows the money in the repo 
market by selling the underlying securities, the transaction is referred to as a “plain 
repo”. In practitioners’ jargon, the seller “repos” the securities, or “reverses out” 
the securities/collateral for repurchase. In a reverse repo, the lender/buyer 
purchases the borrower’s securities for resale and lends the borrower money, thus 
“reversing in” the securities.119 Repo and reverse repo are, therefore, two sides of 
the same transaction; for each repo there is a specular reverse repo. 
Repo transactions are concluded using highly standardized contractual 
models. The boilerplate repo contract terms have been drafted by the industry 
association (ICMA) and constitute the two main Master Agreements (MAs). The 
so-called Repurchases Market Agreement (RMA) privately regulates any US 
Treasury bill under New York State law. In contrast, the Global Master 
Repurchase Agreement (GMRA) governs all repos that have other categories of 
                                                     
117 Counterparty risk is the likelihood of default in the payment of the counterparty; operational risk, in 
the context of collateral evaluation, reflects the cost of managing collateral and margin calling; legal risk is 
related to the cost and timing of litigating the legal title of the collateral; and liquidation risk is the cost of 
delays or devaluation from the sale of the assets in case of default.  
118 The notions of “haircut” and “initial margin” are substantively identical; they refer to the same tool, 
but are calculated and expressed using alternative mathematical terms. The haircut is the expression in 
percentage points of the deduction from the market value of the collateral – e.g., a 5% haircut on a $100 
bond (market value) is reflected in a $95 purchase price. In contrast, the initial margin represents the 
market value of the collateral as a percentage of the purchase price – e.g., a collateral with a 105% market 
value on the purchase price. See ICMA, supra note 30. 
119 See MARCIA L. STIGUM, STIGUM'S MONEY MARKET (2007). 
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underlying securities and generally applies English and Welsh law. The MAs cover 
all of the essential elements of a deal, provide all the contract term definitions, and 
contractually regulate all the steps of the transaction: initiation, confirmation and 
termination, margin and collateral management, income payment, events of 
default, and applicable law and jurisdiction. 
In terms of economic structure and benefits, repos resemble other financial 
contracts. In terms of their structure and purpose, repos present similarities to 
both secured lending and securities lending. While similar, however, these financial 
instruments maintain their peculiarities and differences. While the economic 
structure of a repo has much in common with a secured/collateralized loan, it 
differs on the basis of relevant legal elements and economic dynamics. Repo 
replicates the economic functions of a loan by combining the sale of securities 
with the contextual repurchase agreement of the same assets. Repos are generally 
highly standardized transactions that require liquid, high-quality collateral. In a 
repo transaction, the formal ownership of collateral is transferred from the 
borrower to the lender, while the beneficial and economic ownership stays with 
the securities’ original owner. A peculiar element of repo contracts that makes 
them similar to derivatives is their favourable bankruptcy treatment: they are, in 
fact, exempted from many bankruptcy provisions, such as the automatic stay.120 
 
B. THE ECONOMIC FUNCTION OF REPOS: COLLATERALIZED LOANS AND 
NONDEPOSIT DEPOSITS 
 
Before moving into an analysis of the repo market’s economic functions, it is 
necessary to sketch a picture of the current major actors in the repo market. While 
sellers and buyers are often distinct, because the repo market is fluid, financial 
institutions often play both roles by buying securities and selling them at the same 
time (the so-called “re-hypothecation” of collateral). 
Generally, securities market intermediaries, i.e., broker dealers and leveraged 
investors such as hedge funds or securities firms, are the sellers/borrowers seeking 
                                                     
120 The International Swap and Derivatives Association (ISDA) just recently announced that the 18 
largest derivatives dealers have agreed to contractually soften the right of the non-defaulting counterparty 
to call for an early termination of the contract in a set of specific circumstances – indirectly lightening 
(even if only for 48 hours) the bankruptcy safe harbour of the exemption from automatic stay. See ISDA, 
MAJOR BANKS AGREE TO SIGN ISDA RESOLUTION STAY PROTOCOL (Oct. 11, 2014), available at 
http://assets.isda.org/media/de778136/58b5618f.pdf. See Mark Roe, Reforming Repo Rules, Project 
Syndicate (Dec. 21, 2011), available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/reforming-repo-
rules; id. End bankruptcy priority for derivatives, repos and swaps, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/16da702e-ea41-11de-aeb6-00144feab49a.html#axzz3jHUg2J6G; Edward 
R. Morrison, Mark J. Roe & Christopher S. Sontchi, Rolling Back the Repo Safe Harbors, 69 BUS. LAW. 1015 
(Aug. 2014); Darrell Duffie & David A. Skeel, A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of Automatic Stays for 
Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements (Mar. 1, 2012). U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 
12-02; Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 108; Stanford 
University Working Paper No. 108, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1982095 (arguing that repos 
backed by liquid securities should be exempt from automatic stays, and that repos backed by illiquid 
assets should not be given this safe harbour). 
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to finance their portfolios and short-term investments. Cash providers/lenders – 
the buyers – are generally MMMFs and other entities with high cash reserves that 
are risk averse in investment options. A non-extensive list of these players can 
include commercial banks, insurance firms, corporate treasuries, pension funds, 
local governments, international financial institutions wishing to invest their 
foreign reserves, and, more recently, foreign central banks and sovereign wealth 
funds investing their surplus in foreign reserves. By operating in the internal repo 
market in order to pursue monetary policies, national central banks often operate 
on both sides of the market, depending on systemic monetary needs. 
Due to their structure and flexibility, repos can perform and facilitate a 
variety of economic purposes. From the buyer-lender perspective, repos provide a 
secured form of investment of cash resources. Generally, cash pools have two 
options: buying government bonds, which is commonly considered a risk-free 
investment,121 or depositing them in deposit accounts at a bank. Neither of these 
solutions, however, are the most efficient options for cash pools. Government 
bonds, despite being a secured form of investment, are limited in number and are 
a scarce resource (and the cash reserves that need to be invested far exceed the 
availability of Treasury bills and safe government bonds in general). Bank deposits, 
while potentially unlimited resources, are unsecured investments: deposit accounts 
are only very partially backed by governments through the deposit insurance 
mechanism.122 The gap between these two possible cash investment options is 
filled by the repo market, which potentially provides unlimited secured forms of 
investment. The buyer’s cash, which is invested in the purchase of securities, is 
then returned with accrued interest by the seller at termination.  
For the seller-borrower, compared to a traditional secured loan, repos are a 
cheaper, less risky, more flexible tool for financing. Repo contracts have a lower 
legal risk and more efficient counterparty risk mechanisms than secured loans. 
Securities pools can have more plentiful sources of income in the repo market 
than when they simply hold securities in their accounts or offer them in the 
securities lending market. Repos can also serve a speculative function; parties can 
“go short” or “go long” on a security, depending on whether they choose to be 
the seller of the security or the buyer in a repo. 
In all of this, central banks play a special role. Whether they act as buyer or 
seller, central banks use the repo market as a monetary policy tool to control the 
                                                     
121 This statement mainly refers to Treasury bonds issued by the US government or by other stable 
Western and Eastern governments (including instruments issued by the ECB and European institutions). 
Treasuries are generally considered risk-free assets on the assumption that they are backed by 
governments – that governments have access to “unlimited funding” by printing new money and do not 
fail.  
122 In the US, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides insurance coverage to all 
deposit accounts – including checking and savings accounts, money market deposit accounts, and 
certificates of deposit – at a maximum amount of $250,000 per depositor, per insured bank, for each 
account ownership category. See http://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/. In the EU, the deposit-
guarantee scheme covers up to €100,000, but member states can provide higher levels of protection. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/guarantee/index_en.htm. 
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amount of liquidity in the financial market. By buying securities, they inject 
liquidity into the market; by selling securities, they reduce liquidity in the market.123 
 
 
 
IV. FAILURES IN THE REPO MARKET 
 
The previous sections analysed the economic and legal structure of repos and 
looked at how repos performed in and were central to the Crisis. That analysis 
revealed the structural failures and weaknesses of the repo market. This section, 
building on those findings, identifies the market failures that necessitate reform in 
the repo market.  
This section is structured in four parts, each of which pinpoints a failure in 
the repo market. Part A analyses the opacity of the repo market; Part B examines 
the structural fragilities within the tri-party repo market; Part C assesses the 
regulatory and supervisory misalignment of the repo market; and Part D focuses 
on the market’s systemic risk, looking at the interconnectedness of market 
participants and considering how the maturity and liquidity mismatch in repo 
transactions exacerbates its vulnerability to panic and proneness to run. 
 
A. REPO MARKET OPACITY 
 
The repo market is opaque: repo data are scarce and unreliable. When the Crisis 
hit the repo market, no data were available on the size of the OTC bilateral 
market, and regulators and authorities were completely unaware of its actual size. 
Similarly, until 2010, there were no publicly available aggregated data on the tri-
party repo market,124 and regulators were only able to quantify ex-post the 
aggregated volume of repo transactions concluded by NY Fed primary dealers.125 
Opacity has affected the repo market at a macroprudential and systemic level as 
well as at a transactional and microprudential level. This opacity fully reflects the 
nature of the repo market – namely the OTC nature – and it is structurally similar 
to the situation of the pre-Crisis OTC derivatives market, which was ultimately 
extensively regulated in the aftermath of the Crisis. A whole segment of the repo 
market – the OTC bilateral repo segment – is not captured in any statistical 
analysis, remaining completely opaque. Furthermore, the sample of participants 
                                                     
123 The repo market is also critical for secondary market liquidity in Treasuries and other assets. 
124 The NY Fed became the first entity to publish aggregated data on the tri-party repo market in mid-
2010, implementing one of the recommendations published in the Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform 
White Paper. See NY Fed, Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure Reform – A White Paper, 28 (May 17, 2010), 
Task Force on Tri-Party Repo Infrastructure, available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/banking/2010/an100517.html. For the repo market data 
archives, see NY Fed, Tri-party Repo Statistical Data, available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/tpr_infr_reform_data.html.  
125 See supra note 67. 
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reflected in the NY Fed survey does not accurately reflect the whole US repo 
market, only the primary dealers. The available data are only historical, providing 
past information covering a limited period of time. There are no available data on 
the portfolio sizes, prices, and exposure of market participants. 
The SEC and the Fed had both collected data from market participants via 
regulatory filings,126 but had not made them available to the public. In fact, even 
when they were made public, the data provided a very incomplete picture of the 
market. Regulators therefore have limited information on the overall exposure and 
risk connected to the repo market, repo transactions, and repo collateral. 
Market participants also operated in a marketplace dominated by information 
asymmetries. They lacked information on the market’s dimensions, the total 
exposure of their counterparties, the risk underlying transactions, the collateral 
used in deals, the overall market exposure on individual collateral, and the pricing 
of transactions. The absence of trading utilities increases the transaction costs for 
market participants by increasing the cost of pricing the risk underlying the 
transactions. The public information available is scarce and the private costs to fill 
these gaps are too high. Contracting parties face difficulties in evaluating 
counterparty risk, i.e., the risk that the counterparties will default on their 
obligation, and liquidation risk, i.e., the risk that the pledged collateral will not be 
sold/liquidated on the market quickly enough and without incurring a significant 
discount.127 This opacity made it difficult for market participants to effectively 
price the risk underlying transactions and to accurately evaluate counterparty risk 
and collateral quality. Due to the overall lack of comprehensive data and 
information on the structure and size of the repo market, it was difficult for 
regulatory agencies and market participants to map or assess the risk underlying 
the repo market. This made it challenging for policy makers to develop the most 
effective policy options and to adopt the required measures to monitor, control, 
and mitigate such risk. 
 
                                                     
126 The Fed and the SEC are the two main regulatory agencies involved in the collection of data on the 
repo market. The data collected by these agencies, however, are confidential and – most importantly – 
missing critical elements related to firms’ repo activities. The Fed, for instance, collects data on primary 
dealers via the FR 2004 Reporting Form and through form FR Y-9C for bank holding companies, while 
the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for depository collects quarterly data on the value of 
their repos and reverse repos, as well as on the valuation of collateral in these transactions. Similarly, the 
SEC collects data from money market funds and non-primary broker-dealers via a variety of reporting 
forms, as the X-17A-5 for dealers, the N-MFP, the N-CSR, and the N-SAR for money market mutual 
funds. See Viktoria Baklanova, Repo and Securities Lending: Improving Transparency with Better Data, Office of 
Financial Research Brief Series 15-03, 3-6 (Apr. 23, 2015) (discussing mechanisms to improve 
transparency in the securities funding market). 
127 Both the lack of comprehensive data on the status of the market and at the same time the complexity 
of the few information available made market participants more prone to the herd behaviours and 
intellectual biases and thus more exposed to panic shocks and reactions, see GEOFFREY P. MILLER, TRUST, 
RISK, AND MORAL HAZARD IN FINANCIAL MARKETS (2011) (investigating how trust operates in financial 
markets).  
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B. THE TRI-PARTY REPO MARKET: INTRADAY CREDIT EXPOSURE, MORAL HAZARD, 
AND CONFLICT OF INTEREST 
 
Although its response to the Crisis was better than that of the bilateral OTC 
market,128 the tri-party repo market still contains three main flaws that expose it to 
potential instability and make overall efficient market functioning problematic. 
 
1. Intraday credit exposure 
The first failure in the tri-party repo market connects to the mechanics of the 
business performed by the clearing banks. As previously described,129 tri-party 
clearing banks are agents in the transaction; they are not part of the deal and their 
allotted function is restricted to the collateral management business. However, as 
the Crisis unfolded, clearing banks altered their original business model and 
offered their repo clearing clients intra-day credit extension to facilitate the 
rollover of deals. This changed their role: they stopped being agents and instead 
became principals and creditors for their clients. Simply put, in the early morning 
of every day, clearing banks unwound all repos – even non-maturing repos – and 
returned cash to the repo lenders’ accounts and securities to the repo borrowers’. 
However, before new trades were executed in the late afternoon, at which time 
cash was moved from the lenders’ to the borrowers’ accounts and securities 
transferred from the borrowers’ to the lenders’ accounts, the clearing banks 
financed the borrowers’ securities by extending credit on an unsecured basis.130 
However, these mechanisms were inherently fragile because the clearing banks 
acted on the assumption that every repo would have been rolled over on a daily 
basis and that repo lenders were committed to extending secured loans via repo to 
their counterparties.131 By unwinding non-maturing repos, the clearing banks were 
exposed to significant intra-day credit exposure – the clearing banks, in fact, 
financed the repo borrowers’ securities that were pledged as collateral. It became 
clear when examining the clearing bank business model, which extended intra-day 
credit to repo borrowers, that it was rife with potential vulnerabilities that would 
have destabilized the entire tri-party repo market. Clearing banks built their 
business on three assumptions that later proved to be false: that clearing banks are 
simple agents; that tri-party repo runs are unlikely and secured funding is durable 
and stable; and that collateral is an effective risk mitigant.132 These factors exposed 
                                                     
128 See Adam Copeland et al., Key Mechanics of the U.S. Tri-Party Repo Market, 18 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. 
YORK ECON. POL. REV. 17 (2012), available at 
http://www.ny.frb.org/research/epr/12v18n3/1210cope.pdf. 
129 See Section II.A.1. 
130 See Coplan et al., supra note 128, describing the mechanisms and weaknesses of the tri-party repo 
market. Repo trades were generally unwound by the clearing bank at 8:30 am and new trades were 
completed at 6:30 pm, exposing the clearing bank to a 10-hour credit exposure to repo borrowers. 
131 Id. at 21-24. 
132 See Susan McLaughlin, The Federal Reserve in the 21st Century: Tri-party Repo Market Reform, presentation at 
“The Federal Reserve in the 21st Century” Symposium, available at 
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the tri-party clearing banks and the tri-party repo market to the risk of collapse, 
triggering serious concerns on the part of regulators.133  
 
2. Moral hazard and conflict of interest in tri-party clearing banks 
Third-party clearing banks are financial institutions. On the one hand, they 
provide financial markets with an essential infrastructural service; on the other, 
they are active market participants operating within the markets, competing for 
market shares, and actively investing or speculating in different projects. Clearing 
banks operate as utilities in the repo market, offering collateral clearing within a 
big conglomerate of financial activities. Such commingling of private interests and 
public functions run by the same entities might create distortive incentives in 
clearing bank financial institutions. This might bring about two undesired 
outcomes: increased moral hazard for the clearing banks and a potential conflict 
of interest in performing their clearing functions. A clearing bank might take 
excessive risks in its private activities on the assumption that its role as a clearing 
bank in the repo market and its performance of a utility function would grant it a 
“too important to fail” status that might guarantee public support – either in the 
form of financial assistance or a bailout – in a situation of financial distress. 
Similarly, as market participants operating different lines of business and 
competing for market shares with the very same financial institutions that they 
assist in repo clearing, these banks might be incentivized to offer clearing services 
to their competitors at higher prices or impose higher costs in order to reduce 
their competitiveness and exploit their utility function. 
In conclusion, the fact that a market utility function is performed by private 
financial institutions that offer services ancillary to their main investment business 
exposes clearing banks to a conflict of interest that might require placing the repo 
clearing business in the hands of standalone clearing utilities. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                      
http://www.newyorkfed.org/education/pdf/2013/mcLaughlin.pdf and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cv8grHZCn7I.  
133 The tri-party repo market and its business model were the target of the only regulatory action in the 
repo market. The NY Fed called for the setup of a joint public and industry task force with the purpose 
of fixing the flows in the tri-party market. In February 2012, the Industry Task Force published seven 
main recommendations to strengthen the tri-party repo market; see Task Force on Tri-Party Repo 
Infrastructure - Payments Risk Committee, Final Report, February 15, 2012, available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/tripartyrepo/pdf/report_120215.pdf. All of the documents, materials, and 
results of the Task Force are available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/tripartyrepo/index.html. The seven 
recommendations aim at reducing credit demand by not unwinding non-maturing trades; reducing the 
window to unwind and roll over repos; increasing the transparency of the process and its efficiency by 
automating the trading mechanism; and reducing the maximum amount of intraday credit a clearing bank 
can provide. Since the Final Report was published, the repo industry has been actively involved in a 
reform process of tri-party mechanisms. The tri-party clearing banks – JP Morgan and BNYM – closely 
worked with their clients to change their repo clearance business model and to reduce their intraday 
credit exposure, and as of June 2015, ‘the share of tri[-]party repo volume that is financed with intraday 
credit from a clearing bank has dropped markedly, from 100 percent as recently as 2012, to a level 
averaging 3 to 5 percent today;’ press release available at 
http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/statements/2015/0624_2015.html. 
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C. SYSTEMIC RISK: INTERCONNECTEDNESS AND PRONENESS TO RUNS 
 
Another intrinsic problem of the repo market is its main structure. The repo 
market is dominated by a few participants who exploit rent-seeking positions, 
which imposes high entry costs on potential new players. The current actors in the 
repo market are connected in a dense net of transactions, relying heavily on their 
counterparties to support their financing. As the Crisis revealed, reputation is one 
of the pillars on which the market is founded, and such a strong reliance on 
confidence makes the repo market more prone to the risk of run. The Crisis – and 
the Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers cases – revealed how crucial reputation 
and confidence are to the stability of the repo market. A reputational decline or a 
more drastic loss of confidence in one of the market participants or in an asset 
class has the potential to destabilize the whole market. This situation is further 
exacerbated by the maturity and liquidity structure of a repo. Repos are shadow 
banking instruments: they create short-term, liquid claims that are invested in 
long-term, illiquid assets. Much like bank deposits, the repo market is intrinsically 
unstable due to its maturity and liquidity mismatch. Unlike the bank deposit 
system, the repo market lacks the public guarantees and mechanisms that have 
been introduced in the banking system as stability buffers – i.e., deposit insurance 
and capital requirements.  
As described by Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick in their seminal works on 
the shadow banking system, a repo run occurs when repo lenders withdraw their 
money from the market. This can happen in two distinct ways, both of which 
were experienced in the run leading up to the Crisis. First, repo lenders can simply 
decide not to roll over their repo financing when the repo matures; second, a repo 
lender can ask for an increase in the haircut, thus asking the repo borrower to post 
additional collateral as a guarantee of its funding position.134 
 
D. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE REPO MARKET? REGULATORY AND 
SUPERVISORY MISALIGNMENTS BETWEEN THE FED AND THE SEC 
 
The repo market is a structural segment of the shadow banking system, which 
expanded through regulatory arbitrage between banking and securities regulation. 
For this reason, the repo market developed in an opaque and unsupervised 
environment. Repos are securities market instruments, but at the same time they 
provide banking-like functions in the form of both deposit-like instruments and 
credit. Some repo market participants – MMMFs, broker-dealers, etc. – are 
financial entities that traditionally fall under the supervisory umbrella of the SEC; 
                                                     
134 The authors describe in detail how the drop in value of the securitized products pledged as collateral 
in repo transactions triggered extensive margin calls by repo lenders. Facing extensive margin calls, many 
repo borrowers decided to default on the repo, leaving repo lenders with huge portfolios of depreciated 
assets. Repo lenders tried to liquidate these assets on the market, triggering a fire sale that exacerbated the 
downturn spiral of asset prices. 
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others – i.e., depository banks and bank holding companies – are entities that fall 
under the Fed’s radar. The lack of a comprehensive and coordinated supervisory 
framework for the repo market resulted in an absence of relevant data collection 
and a lack of preemptive stability buffers or mechanisms in the system. The SEC 
has a three-part mission: to protect investors; to maintain fair, orderly, and 
efficient markets; and to facilitate capital formation.135 Even after the 
implementation of the so-called “consolidated supervised entities” program, 
which allowed broker-dealers and their affiliates to voluntarily opt in to the SEC 
financial stability supervisory framework,136 the SEC proved that it lacked 
macroprudential regulatory and supervisory expertise. Similarly, the Fed, while 
collecting individual data on repo and reverse repo transactions operated by 
primary dealers and operating in the repo market for monetary policy purposes, 
completely ignored the repo market, on the assumption that market participants 
and the market structure would have aligned their incentives and mitigated market 
risk. 
 
 
 
V. IS THERE A CASE FOR REGULATING THE REPO MARKET? 
THE FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE PATH 
 
Thus far, this paper has examined the structure of repo contracts and the repo 
market, assessed the active role that repos played in the propagation of the Crisis, 
and identified the market failures that make the repo market vulnerable to 
systemic risk and expose it to market inefficiency. These failures call for a reform 
of the repo market and push back against the regulatory void that we are currently 
facing. Regulators should therefore counter-cyclically intervene in order to 
regulate the repo market.  
In the aftermath of the Crisis, the academic debate on this topic has been 
quite limited. However, a handful of scholars have examined distinctive aspects of 
the repo market and provided various alternatives as to how best to intervene. 
Legal scholars, focusing on the special treatment reserved for repos in the 
Bankruptcy Code, argue in favor of narrowing the repo bankruptcy safe 
harbors.137 Darrell Duffie, a finance scholar from Stanford University who 
investigates the “plumbing of the financial system,” envisions standalone regulated 
                                                     
135 See SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and 
Facilitates Capital Formation, available at http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml; and SEC, 
http://investor.gov/introduction-markets/role-sec.  
136 See SEC 17 CFR Parts 200 and 240 [Release No. 34–49830; File No. S7–21–03] RIN 3235–AI96 
Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers That Are Part of Consolidated Supervised 
Entities. The “consolidated supervised entities” rule has been identified as one of the regulatory failures 
that contributed to the financial crisis. See John Carney, The SEC Rule That Broke Wall Street, March 21, 
2012, available at http://www.cnbc.com/id/46808453; Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Concedes Oversight 
Flaws Fueled Collapse, September 26, 2008, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/business/27sec.html.  
137 Morrison et al., supra note 120; Duffie & Skeel, supra note 120.   
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clearing utilities for the tri-party repo market.138 NYU Stern School of Business 
scholars Viral V. Acharya and T. Sabri Öncü focus on systemically important 
assets and liabilities, calling for a repo resolution authority for the orderly 
liquidation of illiquid underlying collateral as an ex-post mechanism to mitigate 
moral hazard and induce market discipline.139 Yale University scholars Gary 
Gorton and Andrew Metrick look at the repo market in the broader context of 
reforming the shadow banking system and imagine the creation of a binary repo 
market with a stricter regulation of eligible collateral, minimum haircuts, and 
licensed entities.140 Finally, Morgan Ricks, a former Treasury official now at the 
Vanderbilt School of Law, focuses on repos as money market instruments, arguing 
in favour of establishing money creation as a sovereign responsibility by means of 
a private-public partnership system.141 
This paper acknowledges the current scholarly debate and policy options, and 
offers an original alternative policy option to restore the repo market. This option 
is built on the central role of financial market infrastructure (FMI) and is 
achievable in the form of a two-step process. The first step aims at fostering 
transparency in the repo market – an issue left almost untouched by the current 
scholarly debate. The second step focuses on strengthening the repo market’s 
structural mechanisms and stability, and at promoting its efficiency. This policy 
proposal has its foundations in the post-Crisis reform of the OTC derivatives 
market and in two of the pillars underlying the structural reorganization of that 
market: transparency and central clearing. Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act 
introduced these reforms in the OTC derivatives market, and this paper argues in 
favour of extending the same set of rules to the repo market. 
 
                                                     
138 Duffie, supra note 10; DARRELL DUFFIE, HOW BIG BANKS FAIL – AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2011), 
investigating the structural fragilities of dealers’ banks and their unstable short-term funding structure. 
139 Viral V. Acharya & T. Sabri Öncü, A Proposal for the Resolution of Systemically Important Assets 
and Liabilities: The Case of the Repo Market, 9 INT. J. OF CENT. BANKING 291 (2013). 
140 GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND, supra note 7; GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING 
FINANCIAL CRISES – WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM COMING (2012); Gorton & Metrick, Regulating the Shadow 
Banking System, supra note 10; Gorton & Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, supra note 7. The 
authors suggest that repos, as demand deposits, are information-sensitive instruments, and are thus 
vulnerable to panics when adverse information surfaces about the quality of the underlying collateral or 
the stability of the counterparties. Their proposal aims at creating information-insensitive repos – 
replicating the effects of federal deposit insurance on the stability of bank deposits. The authors’ option 
would create two different types of repos: ‘the first type, offered to commercial banks and [narrow 
funding banks], would capture the monetary function of repos,’ while the eligible collateral to be pledged 
in these transaction would be ‘restricted to U.S. Treasury securities, liabilities of [narrow funding banks],’ 
and all collateral used in repos would be required to be subject to minimal collateral. The second type – 
repos not used as deposits or monetary instruments – ‘could be offered by any institutions with a license,’ 
and would be subject to stricter minimum haircut requirements and positions limits. 
141 Morgan Ricks, Money and (Shadow) Banking: A Thought Experiment, 31 REV. OF BANK. & FIN. L. 731 
(2011-2012); Morgan Ricks, Regulating Money Creation After The Crisis, 1 HARV. BUSINESS L. REV. 75 (2011); 
Morgan Ricks, A Regulatory Design for Monetary Stability, supra note 10; Morgan Ricks, Reforming the Short-
Term Funding Market, Harvard University John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics and Business 
Discussion Paper No. 713 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2062334. 
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A. STEP ONE: MAKING THE MARKET TRANSPARENT – THE ROLE OF TRADE 
REPOSITORIES 
 
As previously described, the opacity of (and in) the repo market is one of most 
serious weaknesses unveiled by the Crisis. Repos, much like derivatives, expanded 
in the OTC world, a marketplace dominated by private information in which 
public information and transparency cowered in the background. Repo market 
opacity is not only a threat, at a macroprudential level, to financial stability – 
posing a risk to authorities trying to effectively oversee the market – but also 
represents a market inefficiency at a transactional level vis-à-vis market 
participants, preventing them from effectively assessing and pricing the risks 
underlying repo transactions – namely, counterparty risk and liquidation risk.  
The transparency option is a necessary first step toward creating a more 
resilient repo market. Imposing mandatory reporting of repo transactions to 
centralized entities would provide regulators and markets with aggregated data on 
a variety of market variables. Armed with this data, regulators would be able to 
more effectively address macroprudential risk. Similarly, incentivizing the trading 
of repos in trading venues would strengthen transactional transparency, thus 
increasing the efficiency of the market by improving risk pricing mechanisms. 
Internationally, regulators have begun to explore the option of fostering 
transparency in the repo market. Those efforts – in particular the two paths 
followed by the FSB and the EU in addressing opacity in the repo market – will be 
addressed in the next two sections. 
 
1. The FSB policy framework for addressing shadow banking risk in securities lending and repos 
As already mentioned, the post-crisis regulatory debate neglected to consider 
reforming the repo market. It was only at the end of 2011, when the FSB released 
a broad and very ambitious plan to strengthen the oversight and regulation of the 
shadow banking system, that this issue emerged.142 One of the plan’s five pillars 
was the regulation of securities lending and repos.143 The FSB considered the 
secured funding market to have facilitated the growth of shadow banking activities 
in the pre-crisis world, and to have accelerated the Crisis itself. The FSB 
recognized that repos had enhanced the financial system’s interconnectedness 
through its chains of transactions by facilitating maturity and liquidity 
transformation and by increasing leverage within financial institutions.144 Thus, the 
2011 FSB proposal addressed the systemic risk in the repo market with two 
primary interventions: macroprudential measures related to the transparency of 
                                                     
142 See FSB, Shadow Banking: Strengthening Oversight and Regulation – Recommendations of the 
Financial Stability Board (October 27, 2011) available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2011/10/r_111027a/ (hereinafter FSB, October 2011 Report). 
143 See FSB, October 2011 Report, Recommendation 8 “Regulation of secured funding markets, in particular 
repos and securities lending should be assessed carefully and further enhanced from the prudential 
perspective as necessary”, at 22-24. 
144 Id. 
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the market and microprudential measures vis-à-vis margin requirements and 
haircuts to reduce procyclicality.  
In August 2013 – following the release of an Interim Report in 2012, which 
assessed some of the financial stability issues connected to the repo market,145 and 
after a consultation phase146 – the FSB published its Policy Framework for 
Addressing Shadow Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos.147 The FSB’s 
Policy Framework identified three main policy interventions: steps related to 
improving transparency; microprudential regulation of securities financing; and 
steps related to macroprudential structural aspects of the securities financing 
markets. 
With regard to transparency, the FSB stressed the need for regulators to 
collect timely granular and aggregated data on repo transactions occurring at both 
international and national financial institutions.148 The disclosure of such 
information and the resulting increase in transparency would provide authorities 
with more effective monitoring mechanisms through which to oversee and detect 
risk in the market.149 To promote this outcome, the FSB recommended improving 
disclosure by global financial institutions about their activities and exposures in 
the repo and securities lending markets,150 as well as enhancing fund managers’ 
corporate disclosure and reporting about their activities and exposure in these 
markets to end-investors.151 Collecting quantitative data on the size of repo 
                                                     
145 See FSB, Securities Lending and Repos: Market Overview and Financial Stability Issues – Interim 
Report of the FSB Workstream on Securities Lending and Repos (April 27, 2012) available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2012/04/fsb-report-on-securities-lending-and-repos-market-
overview-and-financial-stability-issues/ [hereinafter FSB, Interim Report]. 
146 See FSB, Consultative Document – Strengthening Oversight and Regulation of Shadow Banking – A 
Policy Framework for Addressing Shadow Banking Risks in Securities Lending and Repos (November 
18, 2012) available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2012/11/r_121118b/; the consultation 
phase was quite active and the FSB received 18 responses that are available on the FSB website, FSB, 
Public responses to April 2012 consultative document Interim Report on Securities Lending and Repos 
(May 6, 2012) available at 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2012/05/c_120807/. 
147 See FSB, August 2013 Report, supra note 11. 
148 See id. Recommendations 1 and 2, at 6-8. In implementing these recommendations, the FSB has 
recently published the standards and process for global data collection and aggregation on securities 
financing transactions (repos and securities lending). This document identifies and defines the repos’ 
‘data elements’ to be collected and reported to the FSB (i,e. value date, maturity date, collateral type, 
collateral quality, haircut, principal amount, counterparty type, repo market segment, repo rate, currency, 
etc.); and sets out the two tier architecture for the repo market data collection and aggregation. Tier one – 
national/regional level: collection of data from the market. Tier two – aggregation of national/regional 
data by the FSB to provide global trends of securities financing markets. See FSB, Transforming Shadow 
Banking into Resilient Market-based Finance – Standards and processes for global securities financing 
data collection and aggregation (November 18, 2015), available at  
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/2015/11/standards-and-processes-for-global-securities-
financing-data-collection-and-aggregation-3/. 
149 Underlying the global and cross-border dynamics of the securities financing markets, the FSB takes 
responsibility for the monthly aggregation and public disclosure of future national and regional data for 
both repos and securities lending, with the aim of providing information on the global trends in these 
markets; see id. Recommendation 3 at 9-10. 
150 See id., Recommendation 4, at 10-11. 
151 See id., Recommendation 5, at 11-12. 
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exposure and qualitative data on the underlying collateral of repo transactions 
would enable authorities to more effectively supervise the repo market and – 
when necessary – intervene to mitigate the systemic risk. Finally, the FSB required 
national and regional authorities to implement the most appropriate measures to 
collect the required data, recommending a certain level of standardization and 
harmonization in designing the disclosure models. 
The microprudential regulation of securities financing focuses on the role 
and treatment of collateral in repo transactions. The FSB position was built 
around the issues related to the re-hypothecation of collateral, as well as the 
valuation and treatment of collateral. The FSB pushed for minimum standards for 
evaluating and managing collateral, and heightened disclosure by intermediaries in 
relation to the re-hypothecation of assets.152 Finally, the FSB took positions on 
potential macroprudential structural aspects of the repo market.153 The 
international policy forum leaves national and regional authorities with the task of 
evaluating the costs and benefits of introducing or supporting CCPs in the inter-
dealer repo market as a measure through which to mitigate systemic risk.154 
Similarly, national and regional authorities are the final arbiters of whether to 
amend the special legal treatment of repos under bankruptcy law.155  
The FSB proposal touched on a wide range of possible policy options. The 
most advanced and developed recommendations, however, focused on improving 
repo market transparency.156 Stressing the importance of standardizing 
information collection, the FSB advanced three mechanisms – regulatory reports, 
compulsory market surveys, and trade repositories – that authorities could 
implement in order to collect data to support their monitoring activities at a 
domestic level. Each of these options presents advantages and disadvantages.  
Regulatory reports may be a feasible and cheap solution to overcome repo 
market opacity in those jurisdictions where the macroprudential supervision of the 
financial market is empowered in a single regulatory authority that is responsible 
for the oversight of financial firms. However, such a solution may be problematic 
where financial firms are supervised by multiple public or private authorities. 
Furthermore, regulatory reporting may have difficulty capturing high-frequency 
reporting, and this reporting may occur at a considerable time lag.157 
Conversely, mandatory market surveys run by industry associations, central 
banks, or financial authorities that periodically collect significant information on 
market development may be an effective approach in jurisdictions with multiple 
regulatory authorities and different reporting regimes. However, such an approach 
might lack the enforcement tools to ensure that all significant participants 
                                                     
152 See id., Recommendations 6-9, at 12-17. 
153 See id., Recommendation 10, at 17-18. 
154 The FSB, while referring to the ‘inter-dealer repo segment’, identifies a repo market that ‘comprises 
primarily government bond repo transactions amongst banks and broker-dealers.’ See FSB, Interim 
report, supra note 145. 
155 See FSB, August 2013 Report, supra note 11, Recommendation 11, at 18-19. 
156 See id., Annex 4, at 40 ss. 
157 Id. at 42.  
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contribute to the data collection, mainly in those scenarios where market surveys 
are run by industry associations. Furthermore, as for regulatory reports, market 
surveys may only register data with a considerable time lag.158 
Finally, a third approach – as adopted in the post-Crisis regulation of OTC 
derivatives – requires a trade repository (TR) to collect, process, and publish data 
on all transaction activity across all market participants and clearing agents in the 
repo market. In this scenario, a TR acts as a financial market infrastructure, 
providing utility services to public authorities and to the market. TRs may 
overcome the problems inherent in regulatory reports and market surveys. If 
market participants are mandated by regulators to report all data to a TR, as 
adopted for the OTC derivatives market, that TR may provide timely, frequent, 
and comprehensive data on all market participants, regardless of regulators.159 
This approach, however, may require an upfront investment in order to establish 
and run a TR – regulatory and economic costs that have already been incurred in 
order to set up TRs for OTC derivatives. 
All three approaches are feasible mechanisms through which to increase 
transparency, require and promote standardization in data disclosure, and support 
effective supervision of risk in the repo market. The first two solutions present 
structural commonalities in the way they collect historical data and provide 
periodic information on the size and characteristics of the repo market. Both 
options are relatively cheap in terms of implementation costs. However, they are 
not structured in a way that captures high-frequency data reporting and they may 
not function as well in an international framework. In contrast, the TR solution 
was used in the post-Crisis reform of the OTC derivatives market, and, despite 
presenting potential implementation costs – TRs are private firms that perform a 
market utility function – would provide public financial authorities with 
standardized, timely, and accurate granular and aggregated data on the repo 
market. In fact, TRs would probably be particularly useful in jurisdictions like the 
US, where repo market participants are a very diverse group of actors – regulated 
and supervised by different entities – financing a diverse mix of assets in the repo 
market.160 
 
2. The EU Proposal for regulating the reporting and transparency of securities financing 
transactions 
The EU is the first jurisdiction to have reached an agreement on a legislative 
proposal aimed at introducing mandatory repo trade reporting to centralized 
TRs.161 That proposal – part of the action plan on shadow banking presented by 
                                                     
158 Id. 
159 Id.  
160 Id. at 42. 
161 See EC, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on reporting and 
transparency of securities financing transactions (Jan. 29, 2014) COM(2014) 40 final 2014/0017 (COD), 
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the European Commission (EC) in September 2013162 – emphasized the 
importance of collecting data ‘to observe the risks associated with 
interconnectedness, excessive leverage and procyclical behaviours…’163 The 
proposed regulation attempted to increase transparency in the securities financing 
transactions (SFTs) market in three ways.164 First, it fostered market and 
macroprudential transparency (transparency towards regulators) by requiring 
mandatory reporting of all SFTs (except those concluded with central banks) to 
central databases, namely TRs.165 Second, it increased investor-facing transparency 
by requiring investment funds to inform their investors about their use of STFs 
and other financing structures.166 Third, it boosted contractual and 
microprudential transparency by limiting the right of the collateral receiver to re-
hypothecate the securities received only in situations when the following two 
conditions were satisfied: (i) the provider of the collateral has granted express 
consent, and (ii) the provider has been duly informed – in writing – of the risks 
involved in granting consent, and, more specifically, of the potential risks should 
the collateral receiver default.167 
 
3. What to learn from the FSB and EU initiatives: A blueprint for increasing transparency in 
the US repo market 
As already sketched out in Section III.A, the opacity of the repo market was one 
of the reasons why authorities were caught unawares and unprepared when the 
market froze. Authorities knew that financial markets relied heavily on the repo 
market as a source of liquidity, but they did not know how deep and critical that 
dependency was. The status quo of data sources – as described in Section III.A – is 
alarming. On the one hand, the NY Fed’s primary dealers survey shows data on 
                                                                                                                                      
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014PC0040 [hereinafter 
EC, Proposal]. 
162 See EC, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Shadow 
Banking – Addressing New Sources of Risk in the Financial Sector (Sep. 4., 2013) COM(2013) 614 final, 
available at  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52013DC0614 (hereinafter 
EC, Communication 2013). 
163 See id. at 10. 
164 See EC, Proposal, supra note 161. 
165 See id. art. 4. Art. 4.7 generally identifies (secondary-level regulation is deemed to be implemented) the 
details of SFTs that should be disclosed: the parties of an SFS; the principal amount, currency, and type; 
the quality and value of the collateral; the method used to provide the collateral; where it is available for 
rehypothecation; the purchase rate; the counterparty; the haircut and maturity date, etc. It is noteworthy 
to mention that art. 2.2 of the proposal expressly exempts the BIS from mandatory reporting, as well as 
the ‘members of the European System of Central Bank (ESCB) and other Member States’ bodies 
performing similar functions and other union public bodies charged with or intervening in the 
management of the public debt.’ Furthermore the ECB, in its published proposal option, strongly 
recommended including in the proposed regulation a transaction-based ‘exemption with regard to 
transactions to which an ESCB central bank is a counterparty.’ See ECB, Opinion of the European 
Central Bank on a proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on reporting 
and transparency of securities financing transactions (June 24, 2014) (CON/2014/49) (2014/C 336/04). 
166 See EC, Proposal, supra note 161, art. 13. 
167 Id. art. 15. 
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repo transactions for primary dealers.168 On the other, SIFMA – the financial 
industry association – and the Tri-party Repo Infrastructure Reform Task Force 
collect and publish monthly data on all tri-party repo market activity in the US.169 
The collected data reflect only two segments of the whole repo market: tri-party 
markets and primary dealers. Data collection completely relied on monthly 
regulatory reports. This situation was and is suboptimal for market transparency; 
however, the range of possible reforms is wide and an effective solution has been 
developed and tested for a different segment of the financial market, the OTC 
derivatives market.   
As of today, no initiatives are being discussed with the goal of setting up a 
uniform and harmonized transparency regime for the repo market. To strengthen 
transparency in the repo market, lawmakers may follow the same approach used 
to illuminate the dark OTC derivatives market: mandating that all repo transaction 
activity across all market participants be reported to TRs. 
TRs, operating as market utilities, will collect, store, process, and disseminate 
all available data on the repo market.170 By accessing the data collected by TRs, 
regulatory entities will be able to more effectively monitor the status of the repo 
market in order to address the risks and vulnerabilities that might arise, and to 
conduct well-informed supervisory and regulatory activities. In addition, TRs will 
be beneficial for market participants and the public, who will have access to more 
detailed information on market trends and data services from TRs. The 
implementation costs for this reform would be limited. Title VII of the Dodd-
Frank Act and the implementing regulation adopted by the CFTC and the SEC 
have already regulated TRs, including their governance, structure, and activities. 
TRs are already operating in the OTC derivatives market; extending their business 
to repo market data collection might be an efficient and profitable solution to 
offset the establishment and compliance costs related to setting up OTC 
derivatives businesses. 
 
 
 
                                                     
168 See http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/statrel.html; the NY Fed has recently reformed the 
approach used to deliver to the public the data on the tri-party repo market by introducing an interactive 
platform; see Jacob Adenbaum et al., The Tri-Party Repo Market Like You Have Never Seen It Before, Liberty 
STREET ECONOMICS, (October 19, 2015, 7:00 AM), 
http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2015/10/the-tri-party-repo-market-like-you-have-never-
seen-it-before.html#.VmcAc7iLTGg; the new interactive charts on the volume of the tri-party repo 
market for each asset class are available at https://www.newyorkfed.org/data-and-statistics/data-
visualization/tri-party-repo/index.html#interactive/volume. 
169 See http://www.newyorkfed.org/banking/tpr_infr_reform_data.html. 
170 The effectiveness of data collection by TRs would be strengthened in a market scenario where a high 
share of transaction activities is centrally cleared. See Section V.B.2. for a more detailed analysis of the 
role and benefit of having CCPs in the repo market. 
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B. STEP TWO: THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL MARKET INFRASTRUCTURE – TRADING 
VENUES AND CENTRAL CLEARING COUNTERPARTIES  
 
Once opacity in the repo market is reduced by mandating disclosure mechanisms 
with TRs, the second step of the proposed repo market reform tries to 
comprehensively address the remaining failures in the repo market. While 
strengthening transparency is a less intrusive reform, the second step – the 
establishment of FMI (namely CCPs and trading venues) – is more invasive, as it 
would seek to resolve problems with the repo market – systemic risk, counterparty 
credit risk, and market inefficiencies – beginning at the foundation of the market 
structure. In a nutshell: similar to the development of a comprehensive 
transparency regime, the establishment of FMI envisions a structural reform of 
the plumbing of the repo market, with trading venues and CCPs acting as public 
utilities in promoting market efficiency and fostering financial stability.  
FMIs are multilateral systems at the heart of the financial system that reduce, 
mitigate, or allocate the inherent risks and costs arising from transactions between 
market participants.171 Some facilitate the matching of demand and offer for the 
purchase of securities; others ease the transfer of cash and securities to settle a 
transaction or record; and still others intermediate and clear exposures between 
counterparties, guaranteeing the performance of financial obligations.172 
The FMI step is built on two pillars, each of which is an actual market utility. 
The first pillar is the trading venue. Trading venues – structured either as 
exchanges, electronic platforms, or alternative trading systems – sustain 
transparency and price discovery in the market, push for higher standardization of 
contractual terms (which in turn lower transaction costs), and further market 
efficiency. CCPs form the second pillar and play a crucial and systemic role in the 
repo market resulting from the proposed reforms. They would not only intervene 
in the mitigation of systemic and counterparty credit risk, they would also act as 
systemic stability buffers and would break the current conflict of interests and 
oligopolistic scenario in the tri-party repo market. 
 
1. Trading venues 
US repos are largely traded in OTC markets, which are private, informal, 
discretionary, bilateral, and opaque marketplaces.173 Dealers or intermediaries are 
at the centre of OTC markets, either trading directly and bilaterally with their 
customers and clients or trading with their peers in the inter-dealer segment. 
Dealers choose the participants with whom they want to trade; similarly, they 
                                                     
171 Amandeep Rehlon, Central Counterparties: what are they, why do they mater and how does the Bank supervise 
them?, 53 QUARTERLY BULL. 147 (2013), available at 
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/quarterlybulletin/2013/qb1302.pdf. 
172 Id. at 149; See also BIS, Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, Technical Committee of the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions, Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures 
(April 2012) available at http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d101a.pdf, at 7. 
173 See Guido Ferrarini & Paolo Saguato, Regulating Financial Infrastructure, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (Niamh Moloney et al. eds., 2015). 
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unilaterally quote the prices at which they will sell or buy, which can vary from 
customer to customer.174 OTC markets are not equally open to all participants: 
dealers have discretion regarding trades and the participants with whom they 
trade.175 An informal, discretionary market not only affects the capacity of dealers 
to choose their counterparties and set the prices they want, but also allows – as 
happened in the midst of the Crisis – dealers in the OTC market to walk away and 
withdraw from the market at any time.176 The sudden disappearance of dealers as 
trading counterparties and “market makers” directly hits the supply of liquidity, 
thus reducing the ability for market participants to find trading opportunities. 
Furthermore, in OTC markets, the lack of published pre- and post-trade 
information reduces the ability of market participants to effectively assess the risk 
underlying the transaction and the counterparty credit risk of the dealer and thus 
price it accordingly. In one example, a market participant may need to conclude a 
trade – e.g., a securities dealer looking to “repo in” securities to cover an open 
exposure. In this situation, without publicly available information, the securities 
dealer might be unable to effectively negotiate the economic terms of the trade 
and would have to accept the price imposed by the intermediary. Some may argue 
that these are simple market dynamics that occur when parties contract freely in 
an open market and walk away from the negotiation when the contractual terms 
are economically unappealing. However, the result achieved is suboptimal in a 
financial market scenario where there is a structural dependence on repo 
transactions to finance short-term liquidity and repo dealers are in the dominant 
position. Similarly, one can imagine a situation in which the dealer is one of the 
largest market actors, in which case there would be pressure on the intermediaries 
to lower the price of the trade in order to keep open new market opportunities.  
A final remark on the structural weakness of the OTC repo markets relates to 
potential structural instability. Dealers can, in fact, withdraw from market making, 
thus suddenly depriving participants of a private marketplace in which they can 
finance their activities or invest their liquidity. This is precisely what happened 
during the Crisis: the main repo dealers pulled out of the market when they sensed 
the systemic instability and unreliability of the financial system. This contributed 
heavily to the drying up of the repo market’s liquidity. 
How can we move forward from the current situation? Repo transactions are 
highly standardized contracts, and the industry private-standard-setting 
organization, SIFMA, has worked diligently to increase the standardization and 
harmonization of the American repo market agreement, MRA, with its global-
European equivalent, GMRA.177 By standardizing contractual terms and 
harmonizing the legal framework for cross-border transactions, SIFMA aims to 
                                                     
174 See generally Randall Dodd, Market: Exchange or Over-the-Counter (March 28, 2012), 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/basics/markets.htm. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 See http://www.sifma.org/issues/capital-markets/rates/repo-and-secured-lending/overview/. 
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reduce transaction costs and increase legal certainty in repo trades in order to 
sustain the repo market’s liquidity. The introduction of trading venues in the repo 
market would be feasible only if the instruments to be traded are liquid and have 
marketability. No venues would, in fact, accept illiquid instruments for trading. 
To foster liquidity in the repo market and support pre- and post-trade market 
transparency, regulators should consider supporting the establishment of repo 
trading venues.178 Although the concept of the trading venue has become fluid 
due to the active role that technological innovation is now playing in the financial 
system, a market operated by a trading venue is a public market: formal, non-
discretionary, transparent, and multilateral.179 A trading venue – be it an exchange, 
a multilateral trading facility, or an alternative trading system – is a self-organized 
entity that, by pre-setting access requirements, reduces the discretion of the 
venue’s operator in accepting the trades. Furthermore, the execution of the trades 
occurs anonymously through the matching of multiple parties’ orders.180 Lenders 
can offer their cash and borrowers can sell their collateral anonymously, “with the 
repo going to the highest bidder in the form of the highest rate.”181 In addition, 
venues publish and make available bid and offer prices to their participants, “who 
can respond by selling or buying at one of the quotes, or by replying with a 
different quote.”182 Pre- and post-trade information is therefore diffuse among all 
market participants who can buy and sell at the same price as other traders. The 
presence of trading venues would also benefit the structural elements of the repo 
transaction. Beyond organizing trading by providing infrastructure, defining rules, 
and monitoring trading participants’ compliance with regulations, venues are 
generally closely linked to clearing facilities, where post-trading activities – namely 
clearing and settlement – are performed. Hence, venues would smooth over the 
whole trading and post-trading process.  
Why is having trading venues in the repo market a desirable solution? First, 
trading venues would cut, or even eliminate, the high reputation entry and stay 
costs in the repo market. Trading venues operate under a pre-set regime and 
market participants are bound by the venues’ rules. Trading venues do not have 
the discretion to refuse or walk out of a trade as a dealer in an OTC scenario can 
do. Once a bid and an offer are matched, the trade is concluded. Moreover, the 
presence of the CCP as a central counterparty for all trades makes each party 
indifferent to the identity and creditworthiness of its matching party; thus, the 
repo price is set by supply and demand.183 Second, in the OTC scenario, dealers 
are market makers: if they face financial distress, they withdraw from the market, 
                                                     
178 See Jonathan Macey & Maureen O’Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation in an Evolving 
World, 58 STAN. L. REV. 563 (2005). 
179 See Ferrarini Saguato, supra note 173. 
180 Id. 
181 See Jeff Penney, Out of the Shadows: Central Clearing of Repo - A Transparent Market Structure for 
Cash Borrowers and Lenders (April 2011) available at http://highlineadvisors.com/whitepapers/cleared-
repo.html, at 18-19. 
182 Dodd, supra note 174. 
183 Penny, supra note 181 at 19. 
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which results in no trading and no market. Trading venues are market 
infrastructures: by simply matching bids and offers, they serve a utility function 
without being market makers. In a situation of systemic financial distress, the 
overall volume of trading might shrink, but trades would not evaporate, as in the 
situation of a distressed dealer in the OTC market. Third, price discovery (both 
pre- and post-trade) would reduce transaction costs for market participants and 
would contribute to a more efficient assessment of counterparty and market risk. 
Without public direct prices or even benchmark prices, risk pricing is remitted to 
private models; these might be exposed to valuation bias, resulting in no easy or 
definite way to evaluate the security.184 
 
2. Central clearing counterparties 
The fulcrum of the FMI reform is the role envisioned for CCPs.185 CCPs are 
market utilities that perform three main operations. As their name suggests, a CCP 
clears a transaction by netting offsetting positions; a CCP interposes itself, 
becoming the legal counterparty to both sides of a transaction; and finally, a CCP 
stands at the centre of the market, operating as a stability and liquidity buffer. 
Financial and legal literature generally refer to CCPs as risk mitigation 
mechanisms; however, the post-crisis reforms of the OTC derivatives market, 
which mandated central clearing for standardized OTC derivatives, have fuelled an 
animated debate about the role of CCPs in the financial market.186 This section 
will first provide a general overview of the role that CCPs play in the financial 
system, with a focus on their risk management function. This will lead into an 
outline of the ways in which having CCPs operating in the repo market would 
make the market more stable, reduce the likelihood of run, and decrease the moral 
hazard affecting the current structure of the repo market.187  
 
                                                     
184 Id. 
185 The academic discussion around the role of CCPs in the post-crisis financial market is wide; see 
generally Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 857 (2014); Sean J. 
Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a Global Market in Derivatives Regulation, 98 
MINN. L. REV. 1291 (2014); Yesha Yadav, The Problematic Case of Clearinghouses in Complex Markets, 101 
GEO. L. J. 387 (2013); Mark J. Roe, The Dodd-Frank Act's Maginot Line: Clearinghouse Construction, 101 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1641 (2013); Mark Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1641 (2013); Julia Lees Allen, 
Derivatives Clearinghouses and Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 
1082 (2012); Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce Counterparty Risk?, 
1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 74 (2011); Jeremy C. Kress, Credit Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic 
Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. LEGIS. 49 (2011); 
Hal Scott, Reduction of Systemic Risk in the United States Financial System, 33 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 671 
(2010); Craig Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure, 31 REG. 44 (Winter 2008-2009); Craig Pirrong, The Economics 
of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, Asymmetric Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a 
Central Counterparty (Jan. 8, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1340660. 
186 See generally RANDALL S. KROSZNER & ROBERT J. SHILLER, REFORMING U.S. FINANCIAL MARKETS – 
REFLECTION BEFORE AND BEYOND DODD-FRANK (2011). This paper takes a position in the debate, but 
a deep discussion of that debate is outside of its scope and will be the topic of future research. 
187 See Penny, supra note 181. 
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a. A clearing primer: What does a CCP do? 
Imagine a situation in which there are three parties: A, B, and C. A is a securities 
dealer who intends to repo in Treasury bills and use the proceeds of the sale to 
finance long-term investments as well as another repo transaction. B is an MMMF 
that is looking to invest a portion of its cash reserves and needs to remove from 
its balance sheet a portion of its investment in T-Bills. C is a broker-dealer who 
needs T-Bills to cover a short position and wants to invest part of a client’s 
account. For the sake of simplicity, this paper examines the role of the CCP in a 
static moment, when the parties have agreed to the trades. 
Let us first analyse a scenario in which there is no CCP and the parties have 
agreed on the terms of the transactions either bilaterally or via an exchange. Here, 
A enters into two repos: in the first one, it sells a $200 T-Bill to B and receives 
$200 back; in the second, it uses $100 of the proceeds of the reverse repo with B 
to purchase a $100 T-Bill from C. B agrees to lend A $200 and at the same time 
agrees to transfer $150 worth of T-Bills to C. Finally, C sells a T-Bill worth $100 
to A and invests $150 of a client’s account to purchase a $150 T-Bill from B. Here 
is how the bilateral transactions look:  
 
 
 
In this market scenario, the total value of the circulating cash amounts to 
$450 and the amount of transferred collateral totals $450. In a bilateral market, 
each party bears the default risk of its counterparty.  
The market structure changes completely when we introduce a CCP into the 
framework. A CCP intervenes once the original parties have agreed on the 
contractual terms of the deal and the transaction has been confirmed. Then the 
CCP “novates” the contracts, which means the CCP substitutes the original 
contract between A and B, for example, with two separate contracts that have the 
CCP as a counterparty respectively of A and B. In finance jargon, the CCP 
becomes the “buyer to every seller” and the “seller to every buyer”.188 A CCP not 
only novates the contracts, but also clears the transactions. More specifically, the 
CCP nets offsetting contractual positions, thus reducing the gross volume of the 
                                                     
188 Craig Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure, REGULATION, Winter 2008-2009, at 44. 
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overall transactions. For instance, looking at the example above, without a CCP, 
the overall value of the transactions between A, B, and C is $450 and the total 
value of collateral transferred is also $450. By having a CCP as the central 
counterparty for all of the deals, the net value of cash and collateral transfer is 
only $200. As the graph below shows, for instance, A is obligated to make a gross 
payment of $100 to C and receive a $200 payment from B. However, with central 
clearing and net settlement, A is entitled to a single net payment of $100 from the 
CCP. The same logic and conclusions can be expanded to B and C, and apply to 
both cash payments and collateral transfers. 
 
 
 
b. How do CCPs mitigate risk and increase efficiency in the repo market?  
CCPs provide the repo market with certain benefits, namely stability and 
efficiency. The immediate consequence of having to clear a transaction is the 
standardization of the contractual terms. A CCP “can smoothly sort out and 
compress a tangle of trades” only if the repo contracts are standardized.189 
Furthermore, a CCP “can make pricing public”; thus, standardization facilitates 
price comparison and the overall transparency of the market.190 In addition, CCPs 
pool, redistribute, and reduce counterparty credit risk through novation and 
netting of offsetting positions; reduce the overall financial risk191 in the system via 
multilateral netting; mitigate systemic risk by providing a loss allocation and 
mutualisation function; strengthen the liquidity supply for the financial market; 
provide more efficient use and allocation of securities as collateral (generally 
considered scarce resources in the financial system); prevent risk spreading; reduce 
the risk of run and panic in the repo market; and strengthen transparency as well 
as legal and operational efficiency. For these reasons, having central clearing for 
                                                     
189 Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, supra note 185, at 1657. 
190 Id. at 1658. 
191 Both risk exposure and settlement costs. 
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repos reduces the instability in the current architecture of the bilateral and tri-party 
repo markets. 
 
 i. CCP as counterparty credit risk assessor and mitigator 
In every repo transaction, counterparty credit risk manifests in three different 
forms: (1) the risk of assessing the creditworthiness of a counterparty; (2) the risk 
connected to the evaluation of the collateral pledged as a guarantee of the 
counterparty’s performance; and (3) the risk that the counterparty will default and 
fail to meet its financial obligations under the contract. These risks are related to 
the fact that the contractual parties negotiate and enter into a deal in a situation of 
information asymmetry. A repo lender, for instance, is not in a position to gather 
information about the overall exposure of its borrower to short-term funding 
contracts. The lender finds it very expensive to monitor the creditworthiness of its 
counterparty; it cannot have access to data on the overall market use and 
distribution of specific securities pledged as collateral, and, in the event that the 
borrower defaults, the repo lender bears all of the losses directly. 
Having a CCP at the centre of the repo market web will mitigate 
counterparty credit risk in four major ways. First, by novating the original repo 
contracts, the CCP will become the legal counterparty for all centrally cleared 
transactions, ensuring financial performance. Each and every repo borrower and 
lender would have the CCP as its lending or borrowing counterparty. By statute, 
CCPs cannot be involved in risky investments and their business model is based 
on a “matched book”, which means that ‘any position taken on with one 
counterparty is always offset by an opposite position taken on with a second 
counterparty.’192 The peculiarity of their “matched book” activity is reflected in 
the maturity of the CCP’s balance sheet. A CCP has “symmetrical [balance sheets] 
in terms of duration, [so] the clearing house accepts responsibility for its members’ 
short-term debts only to the extent that the members can provide the 
clearinghouse with short-term liquid assets.”193 CCPs’ business and economic 
function is to clear trades: they are specialized and sophisticated market utilities 
involved in risk management. CCPs’ capital structure and internal governance are 
heavily regulated and subject to strict prudential oversight by public authorities, 
making them more reliable than other market participants.  
Second, as the numerical example shows, CCPs manage multilateral 
transactions in a more effective way than the bilateral settlement of trades. CCPs 
net, or in jargon “clear”, offsetting transactions on a multilateral basis.194 “This 
means that a delivery of a security due to the CCP from parties A and B can be 
netted off against deliveries of the same security due on the same day from the 
CCP to parties C and D. The same applies to cash payments. This produces much 
                                                     
192 Rehelon, supra note 171. 
193 Richard Squire, supra note 185, at 859. CCPs’ activities do not involve maturity transformation. 
194 See Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, supra note 185, at 1660-1662; Squire, supra note 185, at 863- 869, 
886-887, 899-902, Squire argues that ‘multiparty netting redistributes insolvency risk but not illiquidity 
risk; rather, it creates value by preserving liquidity that otherwise would be lost through bankruptcy.’ 
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smaller net exposures than bilateral netting, in which each party can only net 
transactions with the same counterparty.”195  
Third, CCPs have access to better information, both on the overall exposure 
of one counterparty in the repo market and on the distribution and use of 
collateral in the system. In fact, by collecting and managing collateral for all 
cleared transactions, CCPs can assess how specific securities are distributed in the 
system, how much exposure to specific pledged securities exists, etc. This last 
point is closely connected to fire sale risk, which occurs when there is a sudden 
need to liquidate specific securities pledged as collateral. As the Crisis revealed, 
when many repo lenders tried to recoup their defaulted loans by liquidating 
massive amounts of asset-backed securities pledged as collateral in repo deals, 
ABSs dropped in value and repo lenders had to apply huge discounts to liquidate 
their positions.196  
Fourth, CCPs have in place more effective mechanisms to respond to the 
default of a clearing counterparty.197 While in a bilateral repo, the non-defaulted 
party must directly absorb the losses caused by the default of its counterparty, in a 
centrally cleared transaction, the CCP can manage the default of one of its 
counterparties in a more orderly and less costly way, redistributing the losses 
among all clearing members. A CCP can utilize diverse mechanisms to cover 
potential losses. First, it can try to auction the defaulted counterparty’s position. If 
unsuccessful, it can try to sell the pledged securities on the markets. If the 
proceeds of the sale are still not enough to cover the exposure left by the 
defaulted counterparty, the CCP can – as a last resort – draw resources from what 
is known as the “default waterfall” fund, which includes different forms of 
funding that derive not only from the defaulted counterparty, but also from the 
other clearing members of the CCPs. The purpose of this mechanism is to 
mutualize and absorb the losses from the member’s default among all the other 
clearing members and the CCP itself, before the losses and the risk spread across 
the market and reach systemic proportions. The next section will address in more 
detail how a CCP can act as a systemic risk mitigator in the repo market. 
 
ii. CCP as systemic risk mitigator and stabilizer of the risk of run 
The events that occurred in the repo market during the Crisis revealed how the 
interconnectedness of repo market participants systemically propagated panic, 
                                                     
195 See ICMA, supra note 30, at 24. 
196 See Section II.B. for a more detailed analyses.  
197 See Squire, supra note 185, at 863-872. Squire identifies two main forms of “loss distribution” 
performed by CCPs: loss externalization and loss mutualisation. ‘Loss externalization refers to how the 
clearing house shifts losses from clearing house members to the insolvent member’s outside (non-
member) creditors. Loss mutualisation refers to how the clearinghouse spreads by remaining, non-
externalized losses among the surviving members.’ Loss externalization is mainly achieved by multiparty 
netting – the compensation of offsetting positions – and margin collection. When multiparty netting and 
the posted collateral proves insufficient to cover the losses of the failed member to the CCP, the CCP 
resorts to loss mutualisation mechanisms – the so-called “default waterfall”, which distributes the losses 
equally among all of the non-defaulted clearing members and the CCP itself. 
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ultimately leading to a freeze in the market. The first signs of scepticism about the 
soundness of the repo market started to circulate when Countrywide Securities 
revealed its liquidity shortage, then became more acute when Bear Stearns merged 
with JP Morgan Chase. When the bilateral and tri-party repo markets faced a run, 
as repo lenders withdrew from the market and tried to fire-sale the pledge 
collateral assets in an attempt to recover their exposure, repo borrowers were 
unable to finance their market activities because of the general loss of confidence 
in the securities commonly pledged as collateral in repo transactions. Would the 
situation have been different had CCPs been operating in the repo market? Yes: 
there is evidence that the “run on repo” was more acute in the bilateral repo 
market.198 This paper does not argue that CCPs would have prevented the Crisis, 
but the presence of FMI and CCPs in the repo market would certainly have 
contained the use of taxpayers’ money from the get-go. It would also have 
mitigated the systemic losses related to the market freeze and stabilized the spread 
of panic among market participants.199  
A CCP is a peculiar entity because it is a financial market participant that 
operates under a unique regime. CCPs are subject to stricter risk management 
practices than other market participants; their core business is the clearing, 
multilateral netting, and settlement of risk exposures of offsetting positions. As 
such, CCPs’ capital structure includes specific capital buffers that are set up to 
absorb and eventually mutualize losses in case one or more clearing members 
default on their obligations. The nature of the “default waterfall” – the term used 
to identify all lines of defence that a CCP has in place to respond to the default of 
one of its members – is the mutualisation of potential losses in order to 
specifically avoid the risk that the default of one counterparty might spread 
throughout the financial system.200 Being the prime counterparty for all trades 
does not simply imply that the CCP concentrates the risk in a single place; rather, 
it refers to the CCP’s ability to act as a stability buffer in the event of a run on the 
system.201 
                                                     
198 See Gordon & Metrick, supra note 10, at 279.  
199 Scholars like Mark Roe and Craig Pirrong, focusing on the post-Crisis mandate of the central clearing 
of OTC derivatives, raise critiques of the ability of CCPs to reduce systemic risk, arguing conversely that 
mandatory clearing may increase systemic risk. See Craig Pirrong, supra note 182 at 54 (‘[T]here are many 
channels by which formation of a [clearinghouse] affects systemic risk, and some of these tend to 
increase systemic risk;’); Mark Roe, Systemic Costs of Derivatives’ Priorities, 63 STAN L. REV. 539,586-87 
(2011); Mark Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, supra note 185 at 1663-1691(describing how a clearinghouse 
may increase systemic risk). 
200 See Adam Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses, 101 GEO. L.J. 445, 462 
(arguing that a sound and well-designed guarantee fund makes a CCP a “fortress of capital”). 
201 See Gary Gorton, Clearinghouses and the Origin of Central Banking in the United States, 45(2) J. ECON. HIST. 
277 (1985) (discussing the role of clearinghouses in bank panics in the pre-Fed scenario). Gorton analyses 
the double role performed by clearinghouses in the banking system. Clearinghouses were introduced as 
organized markets to “clear” checks and broadly demand deposit contracts. Yet, in times of panic, 
‘[c]learinghouses were institutional responses to both the possibility and the actuality of […] information 
externalities’ connected to the inability of depositors to ‘identify bank-specific risks[,] so all banks were 
vulnerable to runs,’ id. at 279-280. ‘When a panic occurred, the structure of the banking industry was 
radically altered by the metamorphosis of the clearinghouse into a single, firm-like organization […] [T]he 
first act of the clearing house facing a panic […] was the suspen[sion] of the publication of individual 
                        21/2015 
 
 54 
iii. CCP as liquidity valve 
While this paper has thus far examined CCPs in terms of how they intervene to 
mitigate systemic risk, reduce panic risk, etc., it is now time to acknowledge 
another important function performed by CCPs: their “liquidity partitioning” 
function. This term defined by Richard Squire,202 refers to what CCPs do in the 
event that a member defaults, i.e., ‘faster cash payouts when a trading firm fails’ – 
an important and as yet unexplored benefit of central clearing.203 Multiparty 
netting is the key mechanism that makes CCPs a source of liquidity and certainty 
in the financial market, and which makes faster payout possible.204 ‘The 
clearinghouse accelerates cash payout by engaging in liquidity partitioning: it 
cordons off a portion of a bankrupt firm’s cash assets and short-term liabilities, 
and it applies the first towards immediate repayment of the second.’205 In addition, 
‘the more netting the clearinghouse permits, the greater [is] its capacity to reduce 
illiquidity and uncertainty in a crisis…’206 By doing so, the CCP diverts ‘cash that 
otherwise would enter the bankruptcy estate (where demand for liquidity is 
low)…to financial-sector creditors (whose demand for liquidity is high). Like a 
bailout, the clearinghouse improves the financial sector’s cash ratio,’ but without 
the injection of public money.207 
 
iv. From tri-party clearing banks to standalone specialized CCPs 
As addressed in Section I.A., parallel to the OTC bilateral repo market, the US 
repo market has a considerable volume of trades concluded and processed in the 
tri-party repo system.208 The US financial system relies heavily on two tri-party 
clearing banks as sources of liquidity for the financial system; if these banks were 
to fail, there would be no more liquidity in that system. In the tri-party repo 
market, there are only two clearing agent banks – Bank of New York Mellon and 
JP Morgan Chase – that facilitate the settlement of repo transactions. They are not 
clearing counterparties, but clearing agents for cash and collateral flow. More 
precisely, clearing banks maintain cash and securities accounts for dealers and cash 
investors, and they settle repo transactions on their own balance sheets. A clearing 
bank clears the transaction by transferring, at the deal date, securities from the 
                                                                                                                                      
bank balance sheet information [and the] publi[cation] […][of] the aggregate of all members. This was 
generally accompanied by a joint suspension of convertibility of deposit into currency.’ Id. at 280. 
Through such action, the clearinghouse transformed “bank-specific information” into aggregated 
information, thus eliminating the risk of spotting the weak link in the chain, which could have triggered 
the run. In addition, in order to keep the banking system running, the clearinghouse issues “loan 
certificates”, jointly guaranteed by all clearing members, which could be used in the clearing process: 
‘[T]he existence of clearinghouses suggests that private agents can creatively respond to market failure.’ 
202 See Squire, supra note 185, at 858; 891-906. 
203 Id. at 891. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. 
206 Id. at 905-906. 
207 Id. at 921. 
208 See Section II.A.1. 
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dealer’s securities account to the cash investor’s securities account, and by 
transferring cash from the investor’s cash account to the securities dealer’s cash 
account. Then, at the maturity and closing date, the clearing bank settles the repo 
by performing the same transfers in the opposite direction. In addition to the 
settlement and custody of the cash and securities transfers, the clearing bank also 
performs collateral management functions, and, as critically shown by the financial 
crisis, their business model keeps them from extending credit lines to the repo 
parties. This business model presents serious concerns to market efficiency and 
market stability – concerns that would be more effectively addressed by moving 
repo clearing to standalone clearing utilities. 
Both Bank of New York Mellon and JP Morgan Chase are actively involved 
in competitive financial markets.209 This results in a triple order of problems. First, 
the repo clearing market is not competitive, and the two clearing banks act in a 
dominant oligopolistic position. Second, being active market participants 
themselves, the two clearing banks are potentially heavily exposed to moral 
hazard. The fact that the tri-party clearing organization sits within these large, 
complex financial institutions might trigger their excessive risk-taking in other 
areas precisely because, due to their significant utility function, they expect to be 
backed up by the government in a situation of financial distress. Third, Bank of 
New York Mellon and JP Morgan Chase exist in a perpetual conflict of interest. 
Although these two clearing banks compete with one another and with other 
market participants as they strive to increase their market shares, they each 
provide their competitor with an essential utility function: they clear repo 
transactions in order to fund their investments. In this situation, the clearing 
banks, aware of the heavy reliance of their market competitors on tri-party repo 
funding and exploiting their renting position, might charge higher prices for their 
clearing activities, reducing the competitiveness of the other market participants. 
For these three reasons, moving repo clearing into standalone specialized 
entities would increase the competiveness in the repo market, eradicate the 
potential conflict of interest and moral hazard that lies in the current business 
structure of the repo clearing banks, and simplify the supervision of clearing 
activities.210 Although moving repo clearing to CCPs might impose additional 
operating costs onto market participants, ‘it would enable the investment in more 
robust clearing technologies and lead to a more resilient wholesale funding market 
for broker banks.’211 
 
 
                                                     
209 Both BNYM and JPMC are registered with the Fed as “bank holding companies” and “financial 
holding company” under the Bank Holding, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(1) et seq.; 12 U.S.C. § 1841(3)(I)(1). 
210 See Darrell Duffie, How to Fix the Tri-Party Repo System, YOUTUBE.COM 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvheZyA__90 (last visited August 10, 2015); Darrell Duffie, Fixing 
the Biggest Pipes in the Plumbing of Our Financial System, YOUTUBE.COM 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KOYaP41qaqI (last visited August 10, 2015); Duffie, Replumbing 
Our Financial System, supra note 10 at 259-266. 
211 See Duffie, Replumbing Our Financial System, supra note 10 at 266. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The repo market is an essential part of the plumbing of the financial system. 
Financial institutions and the market heavily rely on it as a crucial source of 
financing and liquidity. The Crisis, however, unveiled serious structural flaws in 
the repo market structure – weaknesses that call for us to reassess whether the 
repo market needs to be reformed. Repos perform economic functions equivalent 
to bank deposits and secured loans, and share with them the very same 
vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the repo market has evolved as an OTC market 
without falling under any regulatory framework.  
The Crisis exposed the failures that are inherent in the repo system. The repo 
market is highly opaque, dominated by a few market participants in dominant and 
rent-seeking positions, intrinsically unstable and prone to run due to the maturity 
and liquidity mismatch of repo transactions, and vulnerable to panics due to the 
absence of any public or private stability buffers or mechanisms. Finally, the core 
role that the repo market plays in the liquidity supply makes any crisis within it a 
systemic one. 
Despite all of these failures and the responsibility of the repo market for 
propagating the Crisis throughout the financial system, regulators decided not to 
intervene and kept the repo market out of the post-Crisis reform agenda. This 
paper challenges the positions of those regulators and policymakers and offers a 
regulatory blueprint on how to build a more sound and efficient repo market.  
Building on the post-Crisis reforms of OTC derivatives, this paper suggests 
that the use of standalone CCPs in the repo market would foster transparency, 
mitigate systemic risk, and strengthen the liquidity supply in the financial market. 
Furthermore, the ancillary evolution of trading venues and trade repositories in 
the repo market would support overall market efficiency by providing market 
participants with more information for risk assessment, and would sustain market 
stability by offering comprehensive information on the market. 
 
 
 
